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INTR ODUCTION

Cities thro ugh o ut the natio n are plagued by the growth of criminal street gangs . 1 To combat this growth, state and local governments
have enacted a wide variety of legislatio n increasing criminal sanctions
for gang be havior. 2 In add ition, state and local governments have
1 See, e.g. , Daniel J . Monti, Origins and Problem~· of Gang Research in !he Uniled Slales, in
GAN GS 1, 1 (Scott C ummin gs & Dani el J. Monti eds., 1993) (noting sharp ri se in gang-related
crime over the last decade); JOHN M. H AGEDORN & PERRY MA CON, PEOPLE AND FoL Ks:
GANGS, CRIME AN D TH E UNDERCLASS IN A RusT!lE LT CITY 11-18 (1988) (comparin g Milwa uk e e
gangs to gangs in Los An geles) ; Daniel J. Monti , Gangs in 1Hore- all(/ L ess-Se/1/ed Communi1ies,
in GANGS, supra, at 2 19 (discussin g ga ng activ ity in St. Louis); N. Denise Burke , Co mm ent,
ReslriCiing Gang Clo1hing in 1he Public Schools , 80 Eo uc. L. R EP. 513, 513 (1993) (noting increase in ga ng violence in Shreve po rt , Louisiana , an d Bellingham , Washington); Ga ry Lee, BigCily-S!yle Gangs Find a New Frontier on Plains of Kansas, L.A. TI MES, Aug. 8, 1993, at B4
(B ulld og ed .) (reporting gang problems in Wichita). TI1is co nclusio n is not universally shared.
Some researchers sugges t that the incre ase in reports of gang- related crim e refle cts changes in
data co ll ection rathe r than rea l increases in gang-related crime. E.g., Susan L. Burrell , Gang
Evidence: Issu es for Criminal Defense. 30 SANTA CLARA L. R Ev. 739, 741 & nn. 7, 8 (1990).
Fu rt hermore, variatio ns in the way data on gang vio len ce is co ll ected thr oughout the co unt ry
makes inferring na tional I rends and makin g ci ty-to-c ity comp a ri so ns problematic. See Chery l L.
Maxson & Malcolm W. Kl ein. Srreer Gang Violence: Twice as Grear. or Half as Grear?, in GANGS
IN AME RICA 71.91 (C. Ronald Huffed., 1990) (noting that est im at es o f gang vi ole nc e in different cities va ry with th e de finiti o n o f gang violence); IRA REINER, OFF ICE OF TilE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, GANG S, C RIM E A:--ID VIOLENCE IN Los A NGE LES 148 ( 1992) (noti ng standards for
reporting ga ng crime va ry from department to departm ent with in th e sa me jurisdiction).
2 For exa mp le . states have enact ed stututes crimin ali zi ng parti cipatio n in gan gs, e.g., ARK.
CoDE ANN. § 5-74-108 (Mic hie 1993); CA L PENAL Co DE § 186.22(a) (West Supp. 1994); GA .
CoDE ANN. § 16-15-4 (Supp. 1993); IND. Co DE ANN . § 35 -45-9-3 (West Supp. 1993); IowA
CoDE ANN. § 723A .I-.2 (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.423 (Vernon Su pp. 1994): Act of
Dec. 10, 1993, § 128, 1993 W1s. LAws 98 (to be codif1 ed a t Wt s. STAT. § 895.77) , e nh ancing
sentences of gang members, e.g. , CA L PENAL CoD E § 186.22(b) (Wes t Su pp. 1994) ; GA. CODE
ANN.§ 16-15-5 (S upp. 1993); MIN:-<. STAT. ANN.§ 609.229 (West Supp. 1994); Mo . ANN. STAT.
§ 578 .425 (Ve rn on Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. AN N. § 193.168 (M ich ie 1992); Martin Be rg,
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turned with increasing frequ e ncy to civil remedies to augment their
criminal law enforcement efforts. 3
Gangs pose a particularly acute problem in California. 4 Reports
of gang violence are increasing, and gang-related ho micides are at an
a ll-time high in the Los Angeles area. 5 Despite th e enactment of new
criminal sanctions to combat gangs6 and the us e of existing law enforcement techniques at their constitutional limits, 7 these efforts have
Oregon Raises Senrences for Gang Mem bers , L.A . DAlLY J., Aug . 12, 1988, at 3, criminali zing th e
e ncouragem e nt of minors to participate in gan gs, e. g. , OKLA. STAT. A:-<N. tit. 21, ~ 856 (We st
S upp . 1994). subj ec ting stree t gan gs to s ta tutes d es igned to c urb organ ized crim e , e.g., T Ex. PE NAL Co DE ANN. §§ 71.01-71.05 (West Supp. 19\14), and penalizing pare nt s fo r th e ir children' s
involve ment in gangs, see Wil liams v. Re in e r, 853 P.2d 507 , 510 (Cal. 1\193) (reasoning th a t 1988
a men dm ent to juve nile delinquen cy statut e was intend ed to enlist pare nts in the antigang fig ht);
MaryS. Penn , Parenrs Could Be Fined !f Their Kids Join Gan gs. C111. TRm., Se pt. 8, 1994 , metro
so uth wes t sec .. at 3 (repo rting e nactm e nt o f ordinan ce s ubj ec tin g parents to tin es and misde mean o r prosec ution for th e ir childre n's ga ng me mbership).
3 For exa mple , states ha ve e nacted st atut es a uth o rizing buildings hab itu a ll y used fo r gang
a ctivity to be declared public nui sa nces, e. g., ARK. C oDE A""·§ 5-74-109 (Mi chi e 1993) ; C.'\L.
PENAL CoD E § 186.22a (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 893. 138 (Supp. 1993); IowA Con E
ANN.§ 657.2 (West Supp. 1993); LA. R Ev . STAT. A NN. § 15:1405 (Wes t 1992); Mo . AN N. STAT.
§§ 578.430-.433 (Verno n Supp. 1994); T Ex. C1v. PR AC. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 125.063 (West
1994), a uth o rizing a civil cause of actio n agains t gangs, e.g. , 740 ILL COMP. STAT. § 147/15
(Smith-H urd Supp. 1994); LA. R Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 15:1405.1 (West Sup p. 1994) , and authorizing
the fo rfeiture of we a pons use d in ga ng activity , e.g. , LA. REv. STAT. A NN . § 15:1405.1; M o . ANN.
STAT. § 578.435 -.437 (Verno n Supp. 1994).
4 Burrell, supra note l, at 741 (notin g that Sou th e rn California is facing "an unprec e de nted
ga ng holocaust").
5 REJNER, supra note 1, at 83, 99, 148; Burrell, sup ra no te 1, at 741. Pa rad oxically, gang
violence in East Los Ange les has been decreasi ng over the past deca de. Joan M oo re , Gangs,
Dmgs, and Violen ce, in G AN Gs, supra note 1, at 27, 37. R egardless, the shocking nature of
ce rtain ga ng- re lated crimes, such as driv e-by gang shoo tings and slayings of innocent bystanders
and th e inte nse med ia cove rage that accompani es th e m have heightened public a nxiety abou t
gang violence even though these crimes may co mprise only a small percentage of gang-re lated
homicides. See Patrick Jackson & Cary Rudm a n, M oral Panic an d the Response to Gan gs in
California, in GAN GS , supra note 1, at 257, 264-65; REtNER, supra not e 1, at 106-07.
6 Some Ca lifornia citi es have passed o rdin ances ba nning ga ng me mbers from ce rtain areas.
See Ri chard L. Colvin, Judge Issues Sweeping lnjuncrion Againsr Gon g, L. A. T lMES , Apr. 8 , 1993,
a t B 1 (home ed. ) (reporting municipal ord inan ce bann ed gan gs from parks in Pom o na); Jim H.
Zamora , Gang Ban Solves Problems f or One Neighborhood. L.A. TlMES, Mar. 7, 1993, a t B3
(Valley ed.) (reporting municipal o rdinan ce bann e d gangs fr o m park s in San fern a ndo) . Ot her
cit ie s are co nsidering simil a r ordin a nces. Patrick J. Mc Donn e ll , Plan ro Ban Gan gs from Parks
Hir , L.A. TJ MES, May 17 , 1993, a t 81 (h o me ed.) (reporting municip a l ordinance banning gan gs
from pa rks being considered in Los An ge les); Matt Lait, Ciry Pon ders Law ro Haufe Drugs in
Parks, L.A. T lMES , Se pt. 28, 1993, at B1 (O ran ge C o unty ed.) (reportin g municipa l ordina nce
banning gan gs from parks being consid ered in Ana heim). Similar efforts by private citizens have
p ro ven less s uccessful. See Sari Wilson, Big Suirs, AM. LAw., Se pt. 1991, at 38; "Gan g Members"
Denied Enrrance ro Them e Park File Civil Rig/us Suir, TllE R ECO RD ER (San Franc isco), Jul y 31,
1991 , at 3 (stating that amuse ment park dropped poli cy of exc ludin g perso ns ba sed on a gangprofi le).
7 For exam pl e, police have begun cond uctin g ·' gang swe eps ," stopping and qu es tionin g suspect ed gang members oft e n based merel y upon how th ey are dressed . See Burre ll. supra note 1,
at 742-4 3; Gordon Dillow, Police Bag rhe Baggy Pwus Crowd in an Effo rt ro Rid Mall of Gangs ,
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not qu elled the increase in gang-related crime. 8 Consequentiy, Caiifornia has been particularly innovative in using civil remedies to control gang activity. 9
O ne such innovation is taking place in the cities of Los Ange les, 10
Burbank, 11 San Jose ,12 Westminster, 13 Oakland, 14 and Norwalk, 15
where ci ty attorneys have asked courts to declare ce rtain street gangs
o r ga ng members public nuisances and to enter injunctions to abate
them. 16 C ity officials and community members report that these injunctions have been extremely effective in red ucing ga ng activity. 17
Becaus e of their success and the universal availability of public nuiL.A. TIM ES, Dec . 3 1, 1993, a t B5 (South Bay e d.) (re po rting that po li ce in Torrance con du ct g an g
sweeps orderi ng ga ng members out o f shopping malls). Th ese m eth od s have drawn severe criticism from civil libertaria ns. E.g., D ebra R. Schultz, C omme nt, "The Righr 10 be l ,er Alone''·
Fourrh Amemlmenr Rigflls and Gang Violence, 16 W. ST. U. L. RE v . 7'2 5, 734-35 ( 1989).
8 Nick A nde rso n, S.J. Makes Mo ve to Reclaim Gang Terrirory, SAN Jo sE MER CURY N Ews ,
Ma r. 10. 1993, at ! A (report ing th at traditi onal police me th ods had prov e n insuftici e nt to control
ga ng ac ti vity in Rocks prin gs a rea of Sa n Jose) ; Co lvin, sup ra not e 6 (re po rting same in Bl yth e
St reet area o f Va n Nuys); Mark I. Pinsky, O.C. Anti-G ang Tactic Ruled Unconsriturional, L.A.
T IMES, Aug . 31, 1993, a t A1 (Orange County eel.) (reporting sa me in We stmin ster); Jim H.
Zamora, B an L oosens Gang 's Grip on a Burbank Street, L.A. Tn,IES, Nov. 1, 1992 . a t B3 (Valley
e d.) (re porti ng same in Burbank).
9 See Bur re ll. sup ra note 1, at 743-44 (noting Los Angeles County effo rt to e njoin ga ngre lated graffiti as a public nui sance) ; Mark Thompson, A Gangland Nuisance, C AL. LAw., Jan.Feb. 1988, at 21 (sa me ).
10 People v. Pl ayboy G a ngster Crips, No. WEC 11 8860 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County
Dec. 11, 1987); People v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los An gel es C oun ty
A pr. 7, 1993) .
11 People ex rei. Fl e tch e r v. Acosta , No. EC 010205 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los A ngeles Cou n ty
Nov. 2, 1992).
12 Peop le ex rei. C it y Attorn ey v. Acuna , No. 729322 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Sa nt a Clara County
Jun e 28, 1993); People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No . CV 739089 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa
C la ra County Mar. 30, 1994).
13 People ex rei. Jones v. Amaya , No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Nov. 10, 1993).
14 People v. "B" St. Bo ys, No. 735405-4 (Ca l. Super. Ct. A lameda Co unt y Jun e 17, 1994).
15 C ity of No rwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los A ngeles Co unt y
Aug. 25, 1994).
16 Other states have enacted statutes specifically a uthoriz ing stree t gangs to be enjoined as
public nu isances. E.g. , 740 ILL. C o MP. STAT.§ 147/35 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); TE x . Crv. PRA C.
& REM. Co DE A NN . § 125.062 (We st 1994).
17 See, e.g., Mik e Cassidy, S.J. Neighborhood on the Rebound: Crack doom on Gangs in
Ro cksprin gs G ets Credit f o r Drop in Crime, SAN JosE MERCU RY NEws. Sep t. 15, 1993, at lB
(stati ng that city officials and community report Acuna injun ct ion e ffective in red ucing c rim e);
Jeanette Regalado, A R eason to Celebrate: Blythe Street R esidem s Hold a Fes1i va /, Promising a
N ew Era in 1he Crime-Ridden Neighborhood, L.A. TIMES, A ug. 14, 1994, at B1 (Valle y e el .) (no ting improvement in ne ighborhood si nce Blythe S treet injunction); WesiSide Gang Crim e Off. L.A.
T IM ES, June 2, 1988, § 2, at 3 (home ed.) (reporting that gang re la te d crim e droppe d 30 % since
Playboy G angsrer Crips injunctio n); Zamora, supra note 6 (noting th at Acosra injun cti on wa s
effective in c urbing crim e ). Residents of ne ighborhoods in which anti ga ng injunctions have rece ntly bee n issu ed loo k forward to similar benefits. See Duke H e lfa nd , Judge Issu es Injun ction
A gainsl G an g in Nor walk, L. A. T III.t ES, Aug. 26, 1994, at Bl (home eel.).
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sance doctrine, other municipalities facing burgeoning gang problems
are considering pursuing similar injunctions. 18
H owever , th ese antigang injunctio ns raise difficult constitutio na l
questi o ns. 19 Fo r instance, since court orders can prohibit o th erwise
lega l cond uct, they o perate as personal criminal codes that may infrin ge upo n defen dan ts' substantive constitutional rights. 20 In ad di tion , emp loying a civil rem edy such as an injunction may deprive
defendants of co nstitutional procedural protections th a t would have
been provid ed if the jurisdicti o n had elected to deter the sa me behavior with av ailable criminal sanctions.2l
Drawi ng o n the Califo rni a antigang injunctions as exampl es, this
Comme nt addresses th ese constitution a l questions by considering
whether anti gang injunctions vio late e ither the substa ntive o r procedura l rights guaranteed by th e U nited States Constitution. 22 P a rt Il
18 Lee H a rris, O rder Sought to Control Gang in Harbor Cicy, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 22, 1993, § 5.
at 7 (Sout h Ba y ed.) (re po rting that Harbor City, Ca liforn ia, is seeking a n ant iga ng injunction );
Susan Leo nard & Victoria Hark e r, "Use a Deadly Weapon, Go to Prison": Romley to Push
Suffer Terms, End of Plea Deals, ARIZ. REP UBLI C, Sept. 15, 1993, at Bl (reporting that Phoenix
is considerin g an a n: igang injunction); Pau l F. Rosell , Public Forum: An Outcry on C rime, Punishment and Taxes, WiCHITA EAG LE, Sept. 16, 1993, at lOa (calling o n Wichita to se ek an a ntiga ng injunc ti o n).
19 Th e difficult y o f the const itutiona l issues is demon st rated by th e differe nt conclusions
reach ed by th e co urts tha t ha ve conside red these injunct ions' constitutionality. See infra notes
46, 49, 51-53 a nd acco mp a nyi ng text.
20 See Madse n v. Women's Health Ctr. , Inc .. 114 S. Ct. 2516,2524 (1994) (" Injunction s .
carry greater risk s of ce nso rship a nd d iscriminato ry applicat io n than do o rdin ances."); Mary M.
Che h, Constiwtional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understan ding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil L aw Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J . 1325, 1407
(1991); Te rence R. Boga , Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, L ocal Governments, and the Battle f o r
Public Space, 29 HAR.V. C.R. -C.L. L. R Ev. 477, 494-99 ( 1994).
21 See Ch e h, sup ra no te 20, at 1329, 1389 -94 .
22 Because thi s Co mment is prim a ril y concerned with the potential use of a nti gang injunctions na tio nwide, it wi ll foc us on whether th ese injunctions vio late the United States Const itu tio n. Consequently, this Comm e nt will not add ress iss ues that a ri se under state sta tutory and
common law, such as the scope of nuisance doctrine o r the ap pl icatio n of equitable principles in
issuing injunctions.
No r will thi s Comme nt add ress iss ues that a rise under sta te consti tutions. State const itu tio nal claims should no t be ignored , however, since stat e co nstitutio ns also protect perso na l li berties. See William J. Bre nnan, Jr., Sta te Co nstillltions and the Protection of fndividual Rights, 90
HAKV. L. R Ev . 489, 495 ( 1977) (noting that sta te cons titution s have historically bee n th e primary
guarantor of civil libe rti es and that stat es a re increasi ngly providing grea te r protect ion of civil
li berti es than pro vi ded by the United States Co nstitution). State co nstitutions ofte n provide
greater protecti on of individual rights th an th e federal constitution. Compare Ci ty of Sa nta Barba ra v. Adamso n, 6 10 P .2d 436 (Ca l. 1980) (ho ldin g zoning ordinance prohibiting unrelated persons from li ving together viola ted Ca lifo rni a's textually-based co nstitutional right to pri vacy)
with Village of Be ll e Terre v. Bo ra as, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (h o ldi ng almost ide ntical zonin g ordina nce did not violate fede ra l non-textually-based con stituti on al right to privacy). It is not e worthy that o ne cour t based its refusal to gra nt a n antigang injun ction in part on the Califo rni a
Co nst itu tio n 's ri ght to privacy. People ex rei. Jo nes v. A maya , No. 713223 , slip op. a t 4 (Ca l.
Super. Ct. Orange Co un ty Nov. 10, 1993) (order denying preliminary injunction) . A no ther a rea
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1rovides th e background for th e analysis by describing the history of
he Ca lifo rnia injunctions and outlining the types of injunction terms
hat raise the most salient constitutio nal concerns. Part III then disusses whether the injunction terms ide ntified in Part II infringe on
tny substantive constitutional rights. Part IV continues the constituio na l analysis with an evaluation of whether certain types of injuncio n te rms are overbroad or void for vaguen ess. Part V then considers
.vhether the procedures commonly fo llowed in iss uing a ntiga ng inunctions comply with th e requirements of due process and a rgu es for
::xpanded procedural clue process prote cti o n. Fin ally, P art VI con:lucles that for the most part, a properly drafte d antigang injunction
;hou ld be fo und constitutional. Neverth e less, Part VI reasserts P art
V's argume nt that defendants of these injunctions sho uld be given
greater procedural protections than normally ass ociated with civil
remedies.

II.

ANTIGA N G I NJ UNCT IO NS IN CALIFORN IA

The antigang injunction cases in Ca liforni a provide a us eful starting point for an analysis of antigang injunctions' constitutionality.
TI1is Part describes these injunctions, which take n together illustrate
the wide range of views courts have taken of antigang injunctions'
constitutionality, the type of terms included in such injunctions, and
the type of procedures used to impleme nt them. Section A begins the
analysis by tracing the history of the antigang injunctions. Section B
th en organizes the most constitutionally significant injunction terms
into specific categories to structure the subseque nt analyses of
whether the antigang injunctions violate the alleged ga ng members '
constitutional rights.

A.

The Antigang Injunctions: West Los Angeles, Burbank, Blythe
Street, San Jose, Westminster, Oakland, and Norwalk

On D ece mber 10, 1987, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Warren Deering issued the first antigang injunction aga inst a gang known
as the Playboy Gangster Crips.23 Applying California's general nuiin whi ch st ate co nstitu tions and courts may provid e greate r prot ec tio n of gang members is equal
protec ti on, particularly if cities dispro porti o nately enjoin minority ga ngs. See Stal e v. Russe ll ,
477 N.W.2 d 886 (Minn. 1991) (subjecting statute tha t disproportionately b urden ed minorities to
mo re pe netrating scrutiny und er th e stat e co nstitution 's eq ual pro te ction claus e th an under the
federal eq ual protectio n clause); Paul D. Murph y, Note, Resrricring Gang Clothing in Public
Schools: Does a Dress Code Violate a Studem 's Right of Free Exp ression?, 64 S. CAL. L. R Ev.
!321. 1356-58 (1991) (noting equal protect ion prob le ms if gang dress codes are enfo rced primarily aga in st minority gangs) .
23 Peo pl e v. Pl ayboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 11 8860 (Cal. Super. C t. Los A nge les Cou nty
Dec. 11 , 1987) (p relimin ary injunction ); see Burrell, supra note 1, at 744 & n.19; Schul tz, supra
note 7, at 733 -34; Boga, supra note 20, at 478 -79: Th o mpson, supra note 9.
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sance statutes, 24 th e court declared the e ntire three-hundred m e mber
gang a public nuis ance and issued a six-point preliminary injunction
against it throughout a twenty-six block neighborhoocl. 25
However, Judge D eering die! not grant all of the injunction terms
request ed by the Los An ge les City Attorney. For instance, he refused
to impose a curfew or prohibit gang members from dressing in ga ng
fashion or associating with other gang members. 2 6 Calling thes e provisions "overbroad in co nt e nt" and " fa r, far overreaching," J udge
D eering said the injuncti on, if approved as originally request ed, wo uld
have "violate[ d) basic constitutionalliberties." 27 Consequently, Judge
Dee ring limite d th e scope of th e injunction to acts already illegal
under Ca liforni a law. zs
Even in this limited form , th e injunction reportedly was effective
in curbing gang-rel a ted crime. 29 In the six months fo llowing the imposition of the injunction , the City Attorney noted that major felonies
dropped eighteen percent and gang-related crime dropped thirty percent.30 R esidents also no ted a m arked reduction in crime throughout
the neighborhood in whic h the injunction was effective. 31 Since the
City Attorney felt that the preliminary injunction had solved th e
24 Under California law, a nui sance is defin ed as "a nythin g which is injurious to health , or is
ind ece nt or offen s ive to the senses, or an obstruction to the fr ee use of property , so as to interfere wit h the co mfo rtabl e e njoyme nt of life or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use , in
customary manner o f ... a ny public park, square, stree t or highway." CAL. Ov. CoDE § 3479
(West 1970). A public nuisa nce is de fin e d as " one which affects at th e same time an e ntire
community o r nei ghbo rh ood , or a ny cons iderable number of perso ns, although the extent of
damage inflicted upo n individuals may be unequal." § 3480. The prope r way to abate a nui sa nce
is with an injunction. § 349 1. City Attorneys a re authorized to bring actions to abate public
nuisances. CA L. Crv. PR oc. CoDE § 73 1 (West 1980).
25 Peopl e v. Pl ay boy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. C t. Los
An ge les County Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injunction); see also Los Angeles Proseclllors to Use
Injun ction Against Street Gang, CRtM. J usT. NEWSL., Jan . 4, 1988, at 20; Regional News: Califo rnia, UPI, D ec. 11, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
26 Compare Complai nt for Te mporary R est rainin g Order, and for Preliminary and Permane nt Injunction , to Abate Public Nuisa nce a t 11 -13, Playboy Gcngster Crips (No. WEC 11 8860)
(filed Oct. 26, 1987) with People v. Playb oy G angster C rips, No. WEC 118860, slip op. at 3 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injun cti o n). See also Los Angeles
Proseclllors 10 Use Injun ction Against Street Gang, supra n ote 25.
27 See Pa ul Feldman , Judge Raps City Atty.'s Bid 10 Neutralize Gangs, L.A . TIMES, Dec. 11 ,
1987 , § 2, at 3 (home ed.) [h e re in afte r Feldman , Judge Raps]; Paul Feldman, Judge OKs Modified
Measures to Curb Gang, L.A . TIMES, Dec. 12, 1987, § 2, at 3 (home ed.). These quoted statements appear only on the decision and do no t a ppea r o n th e face of th e order.
28 The preliminary inj unc ti on proh ibi te d only trespass in g, defacing prop e rty, blocking publi c
ways, urinating or defecating in public , littering, and "annoy[ing) , harass[ ing) , intimidat[ing),
threaten[in g) or molest[in g] any resident, neighbor o r citize n. " People v. Pla yboy Gangster
Crips, No. WEC 11 8860 , slip op. a t 3 (Ca l. Sup e r. Ct. Los An geles County Dec. 11, 1987) (pre limin ary injunction ); see also Fe ldma n , Judge Raps, supra no te 27.
29 See H a rris, sup ra no te 18.
30 See id. ; Westside Gang Crime Off, supra note 17.
3 i See Harris, supra note 18; Westside Gang Crime Off, supra note 17.
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pro blems at which it was aim ed, he m ade no motion to m ake the injunction permanent, a nd it lapsed after one yea r.32
Despite th e success of the Playboy Gangster Crips injuncti o n , no
o ther city atte mpted to e njoin street gang activity fo r nea rl y fi ve yea rs.
However, betwee n Octo ber 1992 and July 1994, a nti gang injuncti o ns
we re so ught in seven se parate cases: People ex rel. Fletch er v. A costa, 3 3
Peop le v. B lyth e Street Gang, 34 People ex ref. City A ttorn ey v. A cuna,3s
People ex rel. Jones v. Amaya,3 6 People ex ref. City Attorney v.
Avalos,37 Peop le v. "B " Street Boy s, 3 8 and City of No rwa lk v. Orange
Street L ocos. J9
Courts grante d th e requested injuncti o ns in Acosta .40 B lythe
Stt·eet, 41 A cuna ,4 2 Avalos;n a nd Orange Street Locos. 44 On ly in B ly the
32 See Zamora. supra note 6.
3 3 Comp lai !1t fo r Te m po rary Restrain ing O rd e r, Prel imin a ry a nd Perman e nt Injunctio ns to

Aba te a Pu bli c Nui sance. Pe op le ex ref. Fl e tche r v. Acosta, No. EC 010205 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los
Angel es County til ed Oc t. 7, 1992).
3 -l Compl aint fo r Pre limin a ry an d Pe rm a ne nt Inju ncti o n to Aba te Pu bl ic N uisa nce. People v.
Bl yt he St. G a ng, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Su per. Ct. Los An gel es Co un ty fil ed Fe b. 22, 1993) .
3 5 Com plaint fo r Te mpo rary R estraining O rde r, Preli mi na ry a nd Perma ne nt Injunct io ns to
Abate a Public N uisa nce, People ex rei. C ity Atto rney v. Acun a, No . 729322 (Ca l. Su pe r. C t.
Sa nt a C!Jra Co unt y fil ed Fe b. 26, 1993) .
36 Complaint fo r Te mpo rary R estrain ing O rde r, Prelimina ry a nd Pe rmane nt Inj unctions to
Aba te a Publ ic N uisa nce, Pe o pl e ex rei. Jo nes v. A maya, No. 7 13223 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. O ra nge
Co unr y fi led Jun e 30, 1993 ).
37 Co mpla int fo r Te mpora ry Restraining O rd e r, Prel imin a ry a nd Pe rma nent Injun ction to
A ba te a Pu blic Nu is ance, People ex rei. City A ttorney v. Ava los, No . C V 739089 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct.
Santa Cla ra Co un ty fil ed Mar. 16, 1994).
38 Co mplaint fo r Injun cti o n a nd Equit a bl e R elief to Abat e a Publ ic Nui sa nce, People v. "B "
St. Boys, No . 735405-4 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Alam eda County fil ed Ma y 18, 1994) .
39 Complaint fo r Pe rm ane nt Injunctio n to Ab a te a Public Nuisa nce, City of Norwa lk v. O ra nge St. Locos, No . VC 01 6746 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. Los An ge les Co unty fil ed July 2 1, 1994).
4 0 People ex rei. F le tche r v. Acosta, No. E C 010205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County
N ov. 2, 1992 ) (o rd e r gran ting prel iminary injunction) ; see also Boga , sup ra no te 20, a t 480- 8 1.
R eport edl y, the A costa injuncti o n has not be en se riously chall e nged in court. See Za mo ra, sup ra
no te 6.
41 Peop le v. Bl ythe St. G ang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los An geles County A pr. 7,
1993 ) (o rd e r fo r prelimin ary injuncti o n) ; see also Boga, supra no te 20, at 48 1- 83. Ava il ab le
sources in d ica te th at th is injunctio n is curre ntl y bei ng appea led. See Respo nde nt's Brief, Peop le
v. Gonzalez, No. B R 33744 (Cal. A pp. D e p ' t Supe r. Ct. Los A nge les Co unty fi le d Ap r. 22, 1994)
(co nce rni ng a ppea l by person con victed of vi o lating Blyth e Srreer injuncti o n).
42 Pe o ple ex rei. City A tt o rn ey v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Ca l. Super. Ct. San ta C la ra Co unty
June 28, 1993) (order gra nting prelimin a ry injunctio n) ; see also Boga, supra no te 20, a t 483 .
News papers repo rt th a t the A cuna injun cti on is bein g appe al ed. See Pa trici a Ja co bus, Oaklan d
Goes Ajier G ang with L awsuir: Nuisa nce Law Us ed Against "B Srreet Boys", S.F. CH RON., Ma y
2 1, 1994, a t A1 7 (fi nal ed.); D a vid A. Sy lveste r, Sa n Jose Bans Gang Members fro m Area, S. F .
CtmoN., Ap r. I, 1994, a t A23 (fin al ed.).
43 Peop le ex rei. City A tto rn ey v. Ava los, No. CV 739089 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sa nt a Clara
Cou nt y Mar. 30, 1994) (orde r gran ting pre liminary inj uncti o n); see also Sy lveste r, supra no te 42.
44 City of No rwa lk v. Orange St. Locos, No . VC 016746 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. Los A nge les Co unty
Aug. 25 . 1994) (pre limina ry injun ction ); see also Helfa nd , supra note 17; City Wins an Injunction
Againsr Vioienr G ang, T HE R ECORD (Los A nge le s), Aug . 26, 1994 , a t A 17 [he rein after Ciry Wins
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Street did the court accompany its order granting th e antigang injunction with an opinion a nal yzing the legal iss ues. 45 In th at o pinion , the
co urt uph e ld the injuncti o n aga inst challenges based on the freedom
of associa ti o n, the right to trave l, freedom of speech , overb readth ,
vagu eness, a nd the right to privacy. 4 6 At least two peo p le have been
co nvicte d an d ano th er two arres ted for violating the Blythe Street injunctio n,47 and at leas t on e person h as bee n convicted and two othe rs
arrested under the Acuna injunctio n.48 Significantly, in all of these
cases the co urt expanded the pe rmissible scope of antigang injuncti o ns
beyond th e limits established in Playboy Gangster Crips and included
provisio ns specifi cally rejected by Judge Deering. 49
lnjunCiionJ; Around the U.S .. DALL AS MoRN ING NEws, Aug . 26, 199~, at lJA. The prelim ina ry
injunction wa s gran ted aft er the judge had initially den ied the city's request for <l temporary
rest raining ord e r. Judge Rejects Offic ials' Bid to Limit Activities of Gang . L. A. T I'-'IES, Jul y 23.
19li-l. at B2 (h o me cd.) ; For the R eco rd, L. A . TtM ES, Jul y 26, 1994. at B2 (hom e ec!.) (co rrect ing
Judge Rejects Ojjicials' Bid to L imit Activities of Gang, supra) .
45 People v. Blyth e St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. (Apr. 7, 1993) (statement of decisio n).
-Hi hi. at S- 16. In the opin ion s, the Blythe Streer court also specifically endorsed th e Los
Ange les City Attorn ey 's decis ion ·to proceed aga in st th e ga ng as an unincorp orated associat io n.
/d. at 6-8: see also infra no te 49.
47 See Th o m Mrozek, Unusual Anri-Gang Injunction Leads to Conviuion of Man for Having
Pager. L.A . TI MES . A ug. 26, 1993, at Bl (Southland ed.) (reporting th a t Jessi e '·Sp eedy" Gonzalez was se nt enced to 90 days in jail a nd three yea rs probation for vio lat ing 8/yrhe Streer injunctio n): Kurt Pitze r, Gang Suspect Gets 45-Day Jail Term, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at B3 (Va lley
ed .) (reporting that Rene Ca rlos Va ldez was sentenced to 45 days in jail for viobting Blyrhc
Streer injun cti o n) ; Hu go Ma rtin , Two Face Charges Under Blythe Street Gang Crackdown , L.A.
TtMEs, Nov. 23. 1993, at B5 (Valley ed.) (reporting that C uthbe rt Sum aya h and Ram o n R odrigo
Aguilera have been charged with viola ting Blythe Srreet injunction). Interesti ngly, one o f the
alleged gang membe rs convicte d for violating the injunction has been arrest ed three additi o nal
time s fo r violating th e injuncti on. See Chip Johnson, Man Charged Again Under Blyrhe Srreet
Coun Order, L.A. TIM ES, Jan. 12, 1994, at B6 (Valley ed.) (report ing that Jessie "Speedy '' Gon za lez has bee n charged with violating injunction a second time) ; David Colk e r, Man Arresred
Again Under Ban on Gangs, L.A. T IMES, Mar. 25, 1994, a t B3 (Va ll ey ed.) (reporting tha t Gonza lez has been charged with vio latin g injunction fo r third and fo urth times).
48 See Mary A. Ostrom, Gang-Control A ction OK'd, SAN JosE !VIERCURY NEws , June 29,
1993. at B l ( repo rtin g tha t two people ar res ted a nd on e pe rson sentenced to 45 da ys in prison
for vi o lating Awna inj uncti o n).
49 For examp le, th e co urt s in Acosta, Blyrhe Street, Acuna , Avalos, a nd Orange Srreer Locos,
gran ted prohibitions aga in st appearing in public and associating with ot her gang me mbers. See
infra part II. B.!. In d ivid ual injuncti ons also contained bans on wearing gang insignia , see infra
pa rt 1!. 8.3, and c ur fews, see infra notes 66-67 a nd accompanying text. All of these provi sions
were rejected in Playboy G angster Crips. See supra notes 26-28, infra note 68 a nd accompanying
text.
It sho uld a lso be noted tha t in three cases, the city atto rn eys did not requ est that the injunctio n be im posed against specific individ uals an d instead proceeded against th e e ntire ga ng as a n
unincorpo rated association. See People v. B lyth e St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 1 (Ca l.
Super. Ct. Los A ngeles Count y A pr. 7, 1993) (ord e r for pre limina ry injuncti on) : Peop le v. Playhoy Gan gs te r Crips, No. WEC 11 8860, sli p op. at 2 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los A nge les Count y D ec. 11,
·! 98 7) (prel imin ary injunction); see also City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. V C 0 16746, sl ip
op. at i -2 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los A ngeles County Aug. 25 , 1994) (pre limin ary injunct ion) (proceed ing agamst both nam ed defen dants and e ntire ga ng as unincorporated associa ti on). In those
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In co ntrast , th e Amaya and "B " Street B oys co urt s declined to
iss ue preliminary injunctions again st the alleged gang members .so
Although th e courts relied in part on equitab le consid e rations, they
both also cited co nstitutional ground s. Specifi cally. th e Amay a co urt
based its rejec tion on the First and Fourteenth Am endm ents to the
United States Co nstitution as well as th e Califo rni a constitutional
right to privacy ,5 1 whil e th e "B " Street B oys co urt ca lled th e pro pose d
injunction " o ve rbro ad " a nd " vag ue" and found th e evide nce re li ed
upon as the basis fo r th e injunction ''co nstitutio na ll y insu ffi cie n t." 52
Notably , the reje cted injunction te rms we re almost ide n tical to th ose
granted in oth e r cases .5 3

B.

Summ ary of Key lnjun crion Terrns

This section provid es th e framework fo r the constitu tio n al a n aly-·
s1 s of th e a nti ga ng injunctions by identi fying five types of injunction
cases. th e po li ce m ~ de the fi na l d e ter mi nati on o f whe th e r a give n ind ividu a l sho uld have been
su bjec te d to a n a nt ig a ng injun ct io n. See inf ra no te 15 1 a nd accom pa nying tex t.
50 Peo pl e v. "B .. St. Boys, No. 7354 05 -4. slip o p. a t 2 (Ca l. S upe r. Ct . Alame d a Co unt y Ju ne
17, 1994) (order de nyin g prelim in a ry injun ct ion ); Peop le ex rei. Jones v. A m aya, No . 71 3223, sli p
op. a t 4-5 (Ca l. Super. C t. O range Count y Nov. 10, 199 3) (order de nying p re limin a ry injunction) ;
see also Pa tr icia Jacob us, Judge Th rows O ut Oakland Suit A gainst Street G ang, S.F. Cl·tR ON ., Jun e
18 . 1994, at A19 (fin a l e d.); H a nn a h Nordh a us. City Can 't Prohibit G ang 's M o vement, TH E R E.
CO RDER (S a n Francisco ) , June 20, 1994, at 6. Th e Amaya court 's refus a l to iss ue a prelim in a ry
injun cti o n fo ll o we d its initi a l g rant of a tempo rary restrainin g order. See A nd rea H e iman , In juncrion Bars G ang Activiry in City , L.A. TtMES, Jul y 3. 1993, a t B3 (O range Co unt y e d. ). Avail able sources indica te th a t th e rejectio n o f th e Amaya inj un ct ion is c urre nt ly be in g a ppea led . See
Be rt Elj e ra, Ju dge 's Ruling on Gan gs A ppealed, L .A.. Ti MES, O ct. 28, 1993, at B4 (Ora nge
C o unty e d.).
5 ! People ex rei. Jon es v. A maya , No. 7 13223, slip op. a t 4 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Oran ge C o un ty
No v. 10, 1993 ) (ord e r de nyin g prel imi nary injuncti o n) . Newspa per accounts re port that th e
co urt grounde d its decisio n in fre edom o f association and ca lled the injunction "an ' impe rm issi ble invasio n of priva cy ' und e r the First A m e ndm e nt. " Pin sky , supra not e 8. H oweve r, thi s la ng uage d oes no t appea r o n th e fa ce o f the writte n o rde r. Pe o pl e ex rei. .Jo nes v. A m aya , No .
71 3223 , slip op . at 4 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. O ra nge Co unty Nov . 10, 1993) (orde r denyi ng p re lim ina ry
injun cti o n) .
52 Pe opl e v. ·' B" St. Bo ys , No. 735 405- 4, slip o p. a t 2 (Ca l. S upe r. Ct. Al a med a Co un ty Jun e
17, 1994) (o rde r de nying p re lim in a ry inj unctio n); see also Ma rk I. Pin s ky & Sa m Enriqu ez,
Tough O range Coun ty A nti-Gang L aw Voided, L.A. TI MES, Au g. 31, 1993, a t B5 (Va ll ey cd.) .
53 Compare Com plai nt fo r Te mpo ra ry Res tra in ing O rde r, Pre li m in a ry and Pe rman e nt Jnjunctio ns to Aba te a Pu blic N u isa nce a t 7-8, A m ay a (No. 71 3223 ) with Peop le ex rei. C ity A t torney v. Acun a, No . 729322, slip o p. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sa nt a Cl ara Co unty Jun e 28, 1993) (ord e r
gra nting pre limin a ry injunction ) and Pe op le ex rei. Fl e tch e r v. Aco sta , No . EC 0 10205 , sli p op. at
3-4 (Cal. Supe r. C t. Los An gel es County No v. 2, 1992 ) (orde r gra nting p re limin ary injunctio n);
compare also C ompl a int fo r Injun cti o n a nd E quit a bl e Re li ef to A ba te a P ubl ic N uisan ce a t 9 -10,
"B" St. B oys (N o. 735405 -4 ) with Pe o pl e ex rei. Cit y A tto rne y v. A va los , No. C V 739089, slip op.
at 3-5 (Cal. Super. C t. Sa nta Clar a C ount y ~1 a r. 30, 1994) an d Peop le ex rei. C ity A tt orn e y v.
Ac un a, No. 729322, sl ip o p. a t 2-5 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. Sa nt a Cla ra Co unt y Ju ne 28, 1993 ) an d People
v. Bly th e St. Ga ng, No. LC 020525, sl ip o p. a t l- 6 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct . Los An ge les Co u n ty A pr. 7,
1993) (o rd e r fo r prel imin a ry inju ncti o n) .
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terms found in California antigang injunctions that raise p a rticular
constitutional problems.54

1. R estrictions on Associating with Other Gang Members.- The
antigang injuncti o ns have all included a provision re stricting the defendant gang m e mbers' asso ciational activities. For exa mple, th e
Avalos, Acuna, and Acosta injunctions prohibited ga ng members from
" stand ing, sitting, walking, driving, ga thering or ap pearing a nywh ere
in public view" with a ny other d efendan t o r gang m e mb er. 55 The
Blythe Street injunction prohibited defendants fro m " congregat[ing]
with a ny other m e mber or affiliate of the Blyth e Stre et Gang for th e
purpose of thre a te ning o r intimidating others in any public place," 56
a nd the Orange Street Locos injunction employed simil a r language_57

54 Foc us is placed on o nl y five types beca use othe r types of injunction terms are well es tablished as proper subjects for nu isance abate ment. CA L P E~JAL CoDE§ 186.22a (e) (sta ti ng tha t
firear ms o wn ed or possesse d by ga ng member cons titut ed nuisance) : Miller v. Int erla ke Stee l
Co .. 649 P 2d 922 (Cal. 1982) (holding excess ive noise constituted nuisance); Phillips v. City of
Pasad e na. 162 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1945) (ho ldin g bl ocki ng of public stree t constitut ed nuisance);
Kafka v. Bozio , 218 P. 753 (Cal. 1923) (holdin g continuing trespass con stituted nuisance);
O'H agen v. Board of Zon ing Adjustment, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. Ap p. 1971 ) (affirming lowe r
court 's ho lding th at litt er ing constituted nuisance); C it y & Co unt y o f Sa n Francisco v. Burton , 20
Cal. Rpt r. 378 (Ct. App. 1962) (suggesting di sorde rly cond uct is nuisance per se); People v.
Amdur, 267 P.2d 445 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954) (ho ldin g bloc king of sidewalk constituted nuisa nce); Burre ll , supra note 1, at 743- 44 ( no ting Ca lifo rni a cou rts have he ld gra ffiti const ituted nuisance). This is consistent with the law of ot her states, which ha ve held th at
organizations th at mak e excessive noise, e.g., Sherk v. Indi a na Wa ste Sys. , In c., 495 N.E.2d 8 15
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802 (U tah 1961), encourage und e rage drinking
and th e resulti ng violence, e.g., D o ugla s v. Ha yes, 144 S.E .2d 756 (Ga. 1965); State v. Cowdrey,
17 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1945 ); Go rdon v. Sta te , 289 P.2d 396 (Okla. Cri m. App. 1955); Parke r v.
Stat e, 208 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff 'd, 212 S. W.2d 132 (Tex. 1948), and a ttract people who
urin a te an d defecate in public, e.g., Armory Park Ne ighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Com munity
Servs., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985) , constitute publi c nuisan ces.
55 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos. No. CV 739089, sl ip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. C t. Sa nta
Clara County Mar. 30, 1994); People ex ref. City A ttorn ey v. A cuna, No. 729322, slip op. at 2
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sa nta Cla ra Coun ty June 28, 1993) (order gra ntin g preliminary injun cti o n); People ex ref. Fl e tche r v. Acosta , No. EC 010205, sli p op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County
Nov. 2, 1992) (orde r gran ting preliminary injunction). In Amaya, the Westmin ster City Attorney
reque sted this sa me prov ision and had it grant ed as part of th e tem porar y restr a ining order;
howeve r, th e Amaya co urt eve ntu all y rej ected it along with the rest o f th e preliminary injunction. People ex ref. Jones v. Amaya , No. 713223, sl ip op. at 4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Or ange County
Nov. 10, 1993) (order denying preliminary injunct ion); Er ic Licht bla et a!., Westm inster Gang
Gets rhe Word-In Wriring, L. A. TIMES, Jul y 11, 1993, at A 1 (Ora nge County e d. ).
56 People v. Blyth e St. Gang , No. LC 020525, slip op. at 4-5 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County Apr. 7, 1993) (order for preliminary injun ction).
57 C ity of Norwa lk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, slip op. a t 4 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los
A ngeies Co unty Aug. 25, 1994) (prelimin ary injunction) (rest ra in in g defe nda nts and unnam ed
gang members from "[c]ongregating in any public plac e with any o th e r person for th e p urpose of
e ngaging in a ny co nduct prohibit ed by this injun cti on").
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A clause banning all association with any other gang member was re jected in Playboy Gangster Crips. 5 s

2. Prohibitions Against Demanding Entry.- Th e Avalos and
Blythe Street injunctions included provisions to deter th e gang's practice of fo rcing e ntry into residents' homes to evade arrest by police.
T he Blythe Street injunction prohibited "demand[ing], or by threat of
force. ent e r[ing] into another's residence," 59 while the Avalos injunction e njoined de fend ants from "[d]emanding entry into ano ther person's reside nce at any time of the day or night. "6°
3. Restrictions on Gang Clothing and Hand Signs.-A!though
severa l cities req ues ted a ban on gang attire and hand signs in th eir
initial co mpl ai nts, 61 only the Avalos and Acuna injunctions in San Jose
ultimately included this type of provision. 62 However, those provisi o ns were co nstructed more narrowly than the generalized bans on
ga ng fas hion , regalia, or colors that have raised constitutio na l conce rn s in other contexts. 63 Specifically, the Avalos and Acuna injunctions prohibited gang members from " [w]earing clothing which bea rs
the name or letters" of the specified gangs as well as using the hand
signs of the specified gangs. 64
58 Compare Complaint for Te mporary Restraining Order, and fo r Prelimin ary a nd Permane nt Injunction, to Abate Public Nuisance at 11, Playboy Gangster Crips (No. WEC 118860)
(r equesting provi sion prohibiting gang members from "associat[ing] with any person who is a
membe r of the Playboy Gangster Crips ") with People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. W EC
118860. slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injuncti o n)
(om itting that provision); see also Paul Feldman, City Atty. M odifies Plan to Control S treet Gang,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1987, § 2, at 3 (home ed.) (reporting that Los Angeles City Attorney was
no lon ge r ask ing co urt to bar gang members from associatin g with one another after court refu sed to gra nt temporary restraining order).
5 9 Pe ople v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. a t 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County Apr. 7, 1993 ) (order for preliminary injunctio n).
00 People ex rei. City Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa
Ciara Coun ty Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting preliminary injunction). The Oakland City Attorney un successfully requested this same provision in "B" Street Boys. Co mpl aint for Injun ction
and Equitable Relief to Abate a Public Nuisance at 10, "B" St. Boys (No. 735405-4).
61 Com plaint fo r Preliminary and Pe rm a nent Injun ction to Abate Public Nuisance at 17 ,
Blyrhe St. Gang (No. LC 020525) (requesting ban on gang attire a nd hand signs) ; Compl aint for
Tem po rary R estraining Order, and for Prelimina ry a nd Perman e nt Injuncti on , to Abate Public
Nuis~mce at 11, Playboy Gangster Crips (No. WEC 11 8860) (requ esting ban o n gang a ttire o nl y).
62 People ex rei. City Att o rn ey v. Avalos, No . CV 739089, slip o p. at 4-5 (Cal. Super. Ct.
San ta Clara Co unty Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting preliminary injuncti o n); People ex rei. Ci ty
Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322, slip o p. at 5 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Santa Clara County Jun e 28, 1993)
(order grant in g preliminary injunction); see also Krysten Crawford, B ig D eals, Big Suits: Ca lifornia v. Acuna, THE R ECORDER (San Francisco), July 29, 1993 , at 2.
63 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 1, at 524 (arguing that school dress codes banning ga ng colors
rai se va gu e ness problems unl ess ca refully worded).
54 People ex rei. Cit y Attorney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089, slip op. at 5 (Ca l. Su per. Ct. San ta
Clara Coun ty Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting preliminary injunction); Peo pl e ex rei. C ity Attar-
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4. Restrictions on Local Mov ement.- The antigang injunctions
imposed two different kinds of restrictions on the movements of gang
members. The fir st kind of restriction prohibited certain types of
move ments designed to spot or flee from approaching law e nforcement officers. These movem ents included being on rooftops in nonemerge ncy situations; climbing tre es , walls, or fences; and passing
thro ug h tunn e ls or ho les in walls and fences. 65
T he second type of restriction on movement was curfews. Bot h
the Orange Street Locos and Blythe Street injunctions prohibited defe ndant s und er th e age of e ighteen from being in a public place within
the affected ne ighborhood during the evening. 66 Furthe rm o re, th e
Orange Sirecr Locos and Blythe Street injunctions instituted curfews
that applied to ad ults as well. 67 The City of Los Angeles a lso requested a similar curfew in Playboy Gangster Crips, but Jud ge Deering denied the reque st.6c:
ncy v. Acuna. No. 72<)322. sli p op. at 5 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Sa nt a Clara County June 28, 1<)93) (on.kr
granting rreliminary injuncti on); see also Colvin. supra note 6; Crawford. supra not e: 62.
65 Cit y of No rwa lk v. Orange St. Locos. No. VC 0 16746. slip op. at 2 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Los
A nge les Co unty Au g. 25 , 1994 ) (pre liminary injun ct ion); Peop le ex rei. City Attorney v. Ava los.
No. CV 7390b9, sli p op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Cl ara County Mar. 30, 1994) (order granting
prel imin ary injunction); Peopl e ex rei. City Atto rn t;y v. Acuna , No. 729322, slip op. a t 4 -5 (Ca l.
Supe r. Ct. Santa Clara Co unty Jun e 28, 1993) (order granting preliminary injunction): Peop le v.
Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Co unt y Ap r. 7. 1993)
(order for prelimina ry injunction). A similar provision was requ es ted and rejected in ·'B" Srrce 1
Boys. Complaint for Injuncti on and Equitable Re lief to Abate a Public Nuisance at 10, "B" S1.
B oys (No. 735405-4).
66 City of No rwa lk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los
A nge les Co unty Aug. 25, 1994) (preliminary injunction) (restraining juvenile defe ndant s and
gang members from being in a public pl ace from 10 p.m. to sunrise unl ess "( 1) accompani ed by a
pa rent o r lega l guardian , o r (2) perfo rming an errand directed by a parent o r lega l guardi a n, or
(3) go ing to/from a meeting or e ntertainment open to the public, or (4) actively enga ged in some
business, trade, profess io n or occupati on which requires such presence" ); Peop le v. Bl ythe St.
G an g, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Count y Apr. 7, 1993) (o rder for
preliminary injunction) (p rohibiting juve nile ga ng members from being in a 120-block area from
8 p.m. to 6 a.m. unless carrying identification and proof that he o r s;1 e was comin g fr o m e ith er a
sc hool activity or a job. ).
67 Th e Bly1he Street injuncti on prohibited a ll persons, adults a nd minors alike, fro m be ing in
a specified two-b lock area in the hea rt of th e neighborhood at any time unl ess carrying identifica ti on and proof of residency in th e area. People v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 , slip op. at
5- 6 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles Co unty Apr. 7, 19<)3) (order for preliminary injunction). Th e
Orange S1ree1 Locos injunction restrained adults from being in a public pla ce between midnight
and sunri se un less "( 1) going to/fro m a mee ting or e ntert a inment ope n to the pub lic, o r (2)
active ly engaged in so me business, trad e, profession or occupation which require s such pres ence." City of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 016746, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los
Angeles Co unt y Aug. 25, 1994) (preliminary injunction).
68 Compare Complaint for Tempo ra ry Restraining Orde r, and for Prelimin ary an d Permanent Injunction, to Aba te Public Nuisance at 11, Playboy Gan gster Crips (No. WEC 118860) wi1h
i"eople v. Playboy Gangste r Crips. N o. WE C I 18860, slip op. at 3 (Ca l. Super. C t. Los Angel es
County Dec. 11, 1987) (p relim inary injunctio n) ; see also Feldman, Judge Raps . Sllpra note 27;
Feldman , s11pra note 58.
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5. Prohibitions Against Annoying or Harassing Residents.- A ll
)f the injunctions includ ed a cla use prohibiting gang members fro m
1aras sing neighborhood resid ents . Th e Playboy Gangster Crips inunction ordered gang members not to "annoy , harass, intimidate,
:hre aten or molest" residents ,69 and the Avalos, Acuna, and Acosta
.njunctions banned gang me mbers from "co nfronting, intimidating,
:mnoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting
and/or battering" residents.70 The Orange Street Locos injunct ion restrained defendants and gang me mbers from " harassing, intimidating,
. . . or otherwise thre atening th e pe ace or safety of any person." 7 1
Si milarly , th e Blythe Srreet injunctio n o rdered gang mem be rs not to
·' ann oy, harass, intimidate , threaten, [or) challenge .. . any person. "72
I n summary, this Comm e nt will consider the constitutionality of
fi ve types of injunction provi sions: restricti o ns on associatin g with
other gang m embers, prohibitions against demanding entry, res tricti ons o n clothing bearing ga ng insigni a, restrictions o n loca l m ove ment, and prohibitions against annoying or harassing resid ents.

III .

TH E ABRID GMENT oF SuesTANTIVE Co NSTITUT IONAL R IGHTS

O pponents of the California antigang injunctions have cha llenged
their constitutionality on the grounds that they infringe on the gang
m embers' substantive constitutional rights. 73 This Part considers the
most significant of these claims. Section A evaluates whether the injunctions infringe upon the defend ants' right to fre edom of association, concluding that street gangs are neither expressive nor intimate
enough to fall within this constitutional protection. Neverthe less, sec69 People v. Playboy G a ngs te r Crips, No. WE C 118860, slip op. at 3 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Los
A ngeles Cou nt y Dec. 11 , 1987) (preliminary injunction ).
70 Peopl e ex rei. City Attorney v. Ava los, No. CY 739089, slip op. a t 3-4 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct.
Santa Clara County Mar. 30, 1994) (o rde r gra nting preliminary injuncti o n) ; Pe o pl e ex rei. Ci ty
Attorney v. Acuna , No . 729322, sli p o p. a t 4 (Cal. Su pe r. C t. Santa Clara Co unt y Jun e 28, 1993)
(ord e r gra ntin g preliminary injunction) ; People ex rei. Fl e tche r v. Acosta, No . EC 0 10205, slip
op. a t 4 (Ca l. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov. 2, 1992) (orde r granti ng preliminary inju nction). A sim ilar provision was requested and rejected in "B" Srreer Boys and Amaya . Complaint
for Injunctio n a nd E quita bl e Relief to Aba te a Public Nuisanc e at 10, '' B " Sr. Boys (No . 7354054): Complain t for Tempo ra ry Restrain ing O rder, Preliminary a nd Permanent Inj un ct io ns to
Abate a Pu blic Nuisance at 8, Amaya (No. 713223).
71 Cit y of Norwalk v. Orange St. Locos, No. VC 0 16746, slip op. a t 2 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los
Ange les Co unty Aug . 25. 1994) (preliminary injun ction).
72 People v. Blythe St. G a ng, No. LC 020525, slip op. at 3 (Ca l. Super. C t. Los Ang eles
Co unty Apr. 7, 1993) (order for preliminary injuncti on).
73 See supra no tes 46, 51-52 a nd acco mpanying text. Injun cti o ns, like statutes, a re subject to
challe nge for infringing upon constituti ona l right s. If a n injun ctio n
inhibits protected free expression, undul y burdens or prohibits associational ti es, o r intrude s
int o pro tected privacy sp heres, it may run afoul of th e [F)irst a nd [Fjourtee nth
[A )m endm ents. Obviously a legislat ure ca nn o t authorize courts to infringe o n protected
freedoms via inj unction s a ny more than it ca n affect those rights dire ct ly through le gisla ti on.
Cheh, supra no te 20, at 1406 n.434.

225

NORTHWESTERN UNIVER SITY LAW REVIEVV

tion A fi nds that law enforcement authorities must be careful to ensure that the injunctions are not applied in such a wa y th at they
constitute guilt by ass oci ation. Section B th en conside rs gang members ' right to freedom of expression , det ermining th at while the
prohibitions of demanding entry are permissible, th e restrictions
against the wearing of gang clothing probably violate th e alleged gang
members' Firs t Amendment rights. Lastly, section C demonstra tes
that the constitutional right to travel m ay no t be im pl icated , an d even
if it is implicated, the injunction terms restricting that ri ght will likely
be found to be reaso nable restrictions of th at right.
A.

Freedom of Association

Eve n though the Constitution does not expl icitly enumerate a
right to freedo m of association, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized such a right.7 4 The Court has re ferr ed to freedom of association in two distinct senses: expressive association and intimate asso ciation .75 This section begins by evaluating each of th ese forms of
fre edom of ass oci ation and concludes that street ga ngs are not sufficiently expressive or intimate to warrant such protection. The Court
has also protected associational rights by prohibiting any finding of
guilt based on purely associational activity .76 This section ends by
concluding th at antigang injunctions can easily constitute impermissible guilt by association and that the authoriti es seeking the injunction
must be careful to avoid this infirmity.

1. Freedom of Expressive Association-One aspect of the fre edom of association, referred to by the Court as the freedom of expressive association, protects people's right to act collectively in exercising
their First Amendment rights. 77 In the seminal case of NAACP v. A labama ex rei. Patterson, 78 the Court for the first time protected th e
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beli efs." 79
The free dom of expressive association was reiterated in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 80 which noted that "freedom of associ ation [is] a peri ph7 4 See. e.g., City of Dallas v. Stangl in, 490 U.S . 19 (1989); New York Stat e Club Ass' n v. City
of New Yo rk, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rota ry Club, 481 U.S . 537
( 1987) : Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v. Claibo rn e Hardware
Co., 458 U.S . 886 (1982); B uckl ey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United Mine Wo rkers v. Illin ois
Sta te Bar Ass'n , 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 41 5 (1963); She lton v. Tuck er,
364 U.S . 479 (1960) .
75 E. g., Roberts, 468 U.S . at 617; Stanglin , 490 U.S. at 24.
76 E.g., Claiborne Hardw are , 458 U.S. at 918-20, 924-26.
77 See, e.g., Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24.
78 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
79 !d. at 460.
so 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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e ra! First Ame ndment right." 81 The Griswold Court went on to define
this right in broad language, stating that " [i]n li ke context , we have
protected forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary
sense but pe rt ain to the social, legal, and eco nomic benefit o f the
members. " 82 Consequent ly, courts in the past have inte rpre ted the
fre edom of e xpressive association expansively, including a wide varie ty of orga nization s within its boundaries, 83 including prison gangs .s4
More recently, the Court has taken a more restrictive view of the
kind of associative activi ty that can be considered expressive. 85 As th e
Co urt stated in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,'l6
" ' [t)h e close nexus be tween the freedoms of speech and assembly'"
does not indicate "that in every setting in which indi vidual s exe rcise
some discrimi nati on in choosing associates, their se lective process of
inclusion a nd exclusion is protected by the Co nstitution. " 87 More
pointedly. in Ciry of D allas v. S tan glin, 88 th e Court rejected respon dents ' claims that an ordinance prohibiting teenagers from being in
dance halls violated the teenagers ' freedom of express ive association,
in part because " [t )here is no suggestion th at these patrons ' take positions on public qu es tions ' or perform any of the other similar activities" normall y associated with expressive association. 89 In so holding,
the Court limited the breadth of expressive association rights, refusing
to recognize a generali zed right of "social association. " 90 The Court
recognized that other courts had often found a right to social assoc ia8 1 !d. at 483.
8 2 fd. ; see also R oberts v. United Stat es Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984 ) (" [W]e have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by th e First Amendm e nt a
corresponding right to associ ate with o th e rs in pursuit of a wide variety o f po litical, social, eco nomic, educa ti onal. religious, and cultural end s.") .
83 E.g., Coa te s v. Cit y of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (stating that freedo m of associ ation includes right of people to gather in public places for social o r politica l purposes); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1980) (overturning ban o n
minors in video arcades on basis of right to associ a tion), prob. juris. n o ted , 451 U.S . 981 ( 198 1).
rev'd on o th er grounds , 455 U .S. 283 (1982); Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 31 1, 3 17 (5th Cir.
1980) (finding First A me ndme nt ri ght of associ a tio n incl udes right to loco mo ti o n) ; cf Byko fsk y
v. Bo rough o f Middl etown , 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (ho lding freedo m o f move ment is protect ed by substa nti ve due process) (citing Coates, 402 U.S. at 611: Griswold. 381 U.S.
a t 500 (Ha rla n, J. , concurring)).aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U .S . 964 ( 1976).
84 See Dawson v. D elaware, 112 S. C t. 1093, 1097, 1099 ( 1992 ) (holding th at abse nt so me
sho wing of rel evanc e, admission of ev id ence of defend a nt 's prison -gang me mbe rship in a se ntencing hearin g vi o lated th e defe ndant 's First Amendment rights).
8 5 E.g., C it y of D all as v. Sta nglin, 490 U .S. 19 (1989); New Yo rk Sta te Club A ss 'n v. City o f
New York , 487 U .S l, 12 (1988).
8 6 487 U .S. I ( 1988).
8 7 [d. at 12 (q uot ing NAACP v. Alaba ma ex ref. Patterson, 347 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
88 490 U.S. 19 (1 989) .
89 !d. at 25 (q uot1 ng Board o f Directo rs of Ro tary lnt ' l v. Rot a ry Club, 481 U.S. 537. 548
(1987)) .
90 !d.
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tion because of the expansive language in Griswold, 91 but it explained
tha t such a broad reading was unwarranted becaus e "the quoted lan guage from Griswold recognizes nothing more than that the right of
expressive association extends to groups organized to engage in
speech that does not pertain directly to politics." 92 O ther courts have
applied this more limited reasoning to hold inapplicable the right to
freedom of expressive association in cases where the association in
question did not tak e positions on political, social, or religious qu estions or other activities associated with th e First Amendment. 93
These decisions indicate that the gang activity res tricted by th ese
injunctions is not protected by the freedom of expressive association.
Like the social o rganizati o n in Stanglin, street gangs typically do not
take positions on public iss ues. 94 Therefore, as in Sranglin, absent indications that gangs undertake First Amendment activities, courts are
unlikely to fi nd gangs to be expressive associations 95
E ve r1 if gangs attempt to gain First Amendment protection by
taking positions on public issues, th ey still may be subj ect to regulations limiting their nonexpressive activities. The Court has made it
clear that no group of persons has the right to associate for wholly
See supra notes 81-82 and acco mpanying text.
490 U.S. at 25 .
93 See. e.g. , Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., A erospace & Agric. Implement
Workers, 485 U.S. 360,364-69 (1988); Rorary, 481 U.S. at 548; Vi ei ra v. Presley, 988 F.2d 850, 85 2
(8th Cir. 1993); Watson v. Fr aterna l Order of Eagles, 9 15 F.2d 235,244 (6th Cir. 1990); Rathert v.
Village of Pe otone, 903 F.2d 510, 517 (7th Cir.), cerr. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990); Swank v.
Sma rt, 898 F.2d 1247 , 1250-52 (7 th Ci r.), cerr. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990); Berg v. Commande r,
Fifth Coast Guard Dist., 810 F. Supp. 703, 7 11 (E.D . Va. 1992), aff'd wirhow opinion, 27 F.3d 562
(4th Cir. 1994); Bush ex rei. Bush v. Cassel- Cokato Bd. of Educ .. 745 F. Supp. 562,569 (D. Minn.
1990); We lsh v. Boy Sco uts, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1430-31 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Burrows v. Ohio 1-IIgh
Sch . Athktic Ass'n , 712 F. Supp. 620, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1988), ajf'd, 891 F.2 d 122 (6th Ci r. 1989);
accord Graham v. Jon es, 709 F. Supp. 969, 972 (D. Or. 1989) (holding that traveling in vehicle
wi th friends and co-workers does not cons titute expressive association); Sunse t Amusement Ct.
v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 496 P.2d 840, 845-46 (Cal. 1972) (h old ing that simple physical activit y or self-amuse ment without some ele ment of com muni catin g or advancing ideas or beli e fs is
not protected by freedom of associatio n), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S . 1121 (1973) ; Pe op le v. Katrinak, 185 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that predominantly commercia lly and
ente rtainment -oriented en terp rise has no commun icative eleme nt and thus is not protected by
free dom of expressive association).
9 4 At recent gang summ its, there we re some ca lls for ga ngs to take a more active ro le in
public affai rs. See Lee Bey, Gang Su mrnir Srresses Politics, CHJ. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at 1
(rep orting that Chicago gang summ it stresse d political empowerment); Jame s L. Tyso n, Black
Leaders Cali on Urban Gan gs ro !Je "New Fronrier of Civil Riglzrs," CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNITOR,
Oct. 26, 1993, at 3 (same). However, th e primary focus of these su mmit s was to e nd gang- rela ted
violence. and ga ng leaders ulti mat ely did no t endorse this call for pub lic act ivis m. /d. Bur see
George Pa paj ohn, A Peek Behind Gang's Talk of Po lirical Acrion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1994. news
se c.. at 1 (C hi cago land final ed.); George Papajohn & John Kass, 21st Century VOTE Giving
Gangs Tasre of Real Po•ver, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1994, news sec., at 1 (north sports tina! ed.).
95 See Boga . supra note 20. at 495-99. Bur see id. at 499-502 (arguing for a broader First
Ame ndm e nt right to pc:aceabk assembly).
91

92 Stanglin.
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illega l aims , and associations engaging in both legal and illega l ac tivities may still be regulated to the ex tent that they engage in ill egal
ac ti vit ies. 96 The m ere existence of some First Amend ment activity
within an association is insufficient to brin g all of its activities within
th e First Amendment. 97 Thus, nonexpressive gang activities suc h as
those giving rise to the nuisance would still be regulable.
Lastly, even if an association is found to be expressive , some infringem ent on its associational rights may be justifiedY8 In Robens v.
United Swres Jaycees, 99 the Court held that enforcing a sta te law
against sex discrimination did n ot unconstitu tiona ll y violate the club
members' right to freedom of association. 10° Co nced ing that the club
does participate in ex pressive activity, 10 1 the Court nonetheless he ld
that the law und e r review was constitutional because it was not a imed
at the suppression of speech, and it was the leas t restrictive means of
achi eving compelling state inte rests. 102 TI1 e Co urt furth er reasoned
that " [t)h ere is ... no basis in the record for co ncluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's
ab ility to engage in these protected activities o r to disseminate its preferred views. " 103
Sim il arly, in Madsen v. Women's H ealth Cen ter, In c., 104 the Co urt
he ld that First Amendment activity may be enjoined so long as the
injunction " burden[s] no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. " 105 The Court noted that numerous significant govern ment interests were protected by the injuncti o n in th at
case. The Co urt then upheld some provisions of th e injunctio n as being suffici ently narrowly tailored to me et the aforementioned standard, but rejected others as unduly burdensome to speech. 106 The
Court reasoned that the injunction was not an impermissible limit on
the First Amendment freedom of associa ti on because " petitioners are
not e njoined from associating with others or from joining with them to
exp re ss a particular viewpoint. The freedom of association protected
96 Madsen v. Women's He alth Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994); see also Donald T.
Kramer , An no tation , The Supreme Co urt and the First Amendment Right of Association. 33 L.
Ed. 2d 865, 895 -98 (1973).
97 New Yo rk Sta te Club Ass'n v. City of New York. 487 U.S 1, 12 (1 988 ).
9
~ ivladsen, l 14 S. Ct. at 2525-30; Roberts v. Unit ed States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 ( 19fi4);
Buck ley•v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); NAACP v. A la bama ex rei. Pa tterso n, 357 U.S. 449, 460 61 (1958).
99 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
J 00 /d. at 623.
101 !d. a t 626.
102 !d. at 623-27.
103 !d. at 627; see also Board of Directo rs of Ro tary lnt'l v. Rota ry Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548
(19fi7) (notin g that a res triction did not require Ro ta ry Clubs to abandon their chosen goa ls).
104 114 S. Ct. 25 16 (1994).
105 !d. at 2525 .
1Ofl !d. at 2526-30.
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by the First Amendment does not extend to joining with othe rs for th e
purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights." 10 7
Thus, e ven if gangs constitute expressive associations, courts may
find th at antigang injunctions are justifiable infringements of ga ngs'
freedom of expressive association. Like the statute in Rob erts a nd
some of the injunction provisions in Mads en, antigang injunctio ns
serve signi fi cant, if not compelling, gove rnment interests by ab a ting
the th re a t to public he alth a nd safe ty caused by public nuisances . 10 S
Moreover, as in Roberts and Madsen, the regulation, being limite d in
geographic scope , does not " impede the organization 's ability to engage in . . . protected activities or to disseminate its prefe rre d vi e ws"
because ga ng members can still conduct their expressive activities
elsewhe re. 109 There fore , eve n if courts find that gangs are express ive
association s, co urts may still iss ue injunctions if they are suffici e ntl y
tailored .

2. Freedom of Intimate Association-It is also unlik e ly that
gangs will be protected by the freedom of intimate association, 1 w
which protects those "deep attachme nts and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a spe cial
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
person a l aspects of one 's life." 111 Determining whether a given association falls within these parameters has proven to be a difficult task.
As the Supreme Court noted in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. R otary Club of Duarte:
We have not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type o f
constitutional protection .. . . But .. . we observed that "[ d]etermining
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a
particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful ass essment of
where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum
107 !d. at 25 30.

!08 See. e. g. , Leon a rdson v. City of E. La nsing, 896 F.2d 190, 198 (6th Cir. 1990) (recogn izi ng
city had co mpellin g interes t in abating public nuisance cause d by large, semiannual student
part y).
109 R oberrs, 468 U.S. at 627; see also Mads en, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2, 2530.
110 Co urt s ha ve ge ne rall y trea ted th e fr ee dom o f intimate associ ati o n as a First A men d men t
ri ght. E.g .. D awson v. Del a ware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097, 1099 (1992); City of Dallas v. Stanglin ,
490 U.S . 19, 25 (1 989). Arguabl y, fr ee dom of associati o n ca n be und e rstood as a n aspec t o f
libe rty pro tec te d by th e Du e Proce ss Cla us es as we ll. E.g., Roberrs, 468 U.S. at 620; S ranglin . 490
U .S. at 28 (St eve ns. J., co ncurrin g). Howe ver , give n th e na rrow vis ion o f du e pr ocess li be rty
tak e n by the Co urt in Bowe rs v. Hardwick, 478 U .S. 186 (1986) , it is unlikely that a due process
approa ch wil l provi de an y more pro tec tion fo r intimat e associations than will th e First A me ndme nt ap proach. See Willi a m P. Marsh all, Discriminarion and rhe Righi of Associa rion , 8 1 Nw. U .
L. REV. 68 . 81 (1986) .
1 11 Boa rd of Direc to rs of Ro ta ry 1nt ' l v. Rotary Club, 481 U .S. 537, 545 (1987) (qu o tin g Rob ·
errs, 468 U.S. a t 619-20) . See generally Kenn e th L. Karst, Th e Freedom of ln rim are Associarion ,
89 YAL E L.J. 624 ( 1990).
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The Court has considered se veral factors in evaluating wh ether a
elationship falls within the right of intimate association. Specifically,
he Co urt has looked at "size , purpose, selec tivity [in beginning and
naintaining the relationship], and whether others are excluded from
:ritical aspects of the relatio nship. " 11 3 App lying this an alysis, th e
:::o urt in Rotary concluded that since the clubs numb ered in size from
we nty to nine hundred, recruitin g and turnover were constant, and
;lub activities were open to no nmem bers, the clubs " [did] no t suggest
he kind of private or personal relationship to which we have accord ed
Jrotec tion und er the First Amendment." 1 1-l
Viewing antigang injunctio ns with th ose considerations in mind ,
:::rimin al street gangs, like th e clubs in Rotary, clearly do not constitute
intimate associations. 11 5 Like Rotary C lubs , the gangs involved in
these particular cases are relatively large, ranging in size from thirtyeight to four hundred fifty members. 1 16 Moreove r, as in Rotary , the
fact that gangs engage in constant recruitm ent activity 11 7 and open
their activities to nonmembers 1 Js belies any claim that street gangs
112 Rorary, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberr:;, 468 U.S. a t 620) (a lteration to qu otation in
original ).
113 !d. at 546 (quoting R oberls, 468 U.S. at 620).
114 !d. at 546-47.
115 Boga, supra note 20, at 495-99.
116 Pa ul Feldman, Court R ejects Ci1y Allorney's B id ro Curb Westside Gang's Movemems, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1987, § 2, a t 1 (home ed.) (numbering Playboy Gangster Crips at more than 200
members) ; Ciry Wins Injuncrion, supra note 44 (numbering Orange Street Locos at 60 members);
Jim H. Za mora, Valley Is Model in Ami-Gang Effor£, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, a t B2 (Va ll ey
ed. ) (numbering Blythe Stree t ga ng at 450 mem bers). Size es timates for the other ga ngs were
un avail able, although the substantial num be r o f na med defendants and unnam ed " D oes" suggests unn amed ga ngs of substantial size. See Complaint fo r Injunction and Equita bl e Relief to
Abate a Public Nuisance at 1, People v. "B" St. Boys, No. 735405-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County filed May 18, 1994) (18 defendants, 50 unn amed Does, an d entire gang as uninco rpo ra ted association) ; People ex rei. City Atto rney v. Avalos, No. CV 739089. sli p o p. at 1 (Ca l.
Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Mar. 30, 1994) (24 defendants and 100 unn amed D oes); Co mplaint for Temporary Rest raining Order, Prelimin ary and Permanent Inju ncti ons to A bate a
Public Nuisance at 1, People ex rei. Jones v. Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Co un ty
filed Jun e 30, 1993) (59 defendants and 100 unnam ed Does); Co mpl ain t for Te mpo rary Restraining Order, Prelimin a ry Injunctio n and Perm anent Injuncti on to Abate a Pu blic N uis ance at
2-3, People ex rei. City Atto rney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Sup er. Ct. Sa nt a Cla ra Co unty f1l ed
Feb. 26, 1993) (38 defendants and 100 unnamed D oes); People ex rei. Fletcher v. Acosta, No. EC
010205 , slip op. at 1-2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Lo s A nge le s Cou nty No v. 2, 1992) (order granting preliminary injunction ) (88 defendants and 100 unn amed Does).
117 People v. Bl ythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 , slip op. at 7 (Cal. Supe r. Ct. Los Angeles
Co unty Apr. 7, 1993) (sta tement of decision) (notin g Bl yth e St ree t gang members share common
purpose to recruit new membe rs); R EINER, supra note 1, at 22 (cit ing th at mos t gangs ·'p robably
e ngage in so me form of active recruitme nt " ).
118 Re in er, supra note 1, at 41-44 (notin g that nonmembers Me allowed to part icipate in gang
ac tivi ties).
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constitute an intimate association. Nor is the existence of intimate
relationships between certain gang members sufficient to render th e
entire ga ng an intimate association worthy of constitutional protection.119 As the Court held in N ew York State Club A ss 'n v. City of
New York, 120 " [i]t may well be that a considerable amount of private
or intimate association occurs in such a se tting, ... but that fact alone
does not affo rd the entity as a wh ole any constitutional immunity." 12 t
Therefore, courts should reject defendants' a rgument that an injunction would inhibit intimate associations.

3. Guilt by Association.- Law e nforcement authoriti es must e nsure th at antigang injunctions are not implemented in a way that co nstitutes guilt by association. Alth o ugh peo ple d o not have the right to
associate for the purpose of pursuing wh olly unlawful aims, 122 association s with both legal and illegal goals prese nt a differen t case. 12 J T h e
Supreme Court has made it clear that me mbers of an association with
both legal and illegal goals cannot b e held liabl e for th e associ a ti o n' s
illegal activities unless they ac tively participated in those illegal ac ti o ns with the specific intent of furth e ring th e association's illegal
a ims.124
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 125 is illustrative . In Claiborne Hardware, black citizens were boycotting white merchants to
t t9 See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Amicus Curi ae ACLU in Opposition
to Motion for Preliminary Injuncti on at 16, Blythe St. Gang (No. LC 020525) (filed Mar. 10,
1993) (arguing that injunction violates fre edom of association by preven ting siblin gs from sit ting
toget her on th eir own front porch) .
120 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
12 1 !d. at 12 (ci tati on omitted); see also Madsen v. Women's H ea lth Ct r., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 25 16,
2530 ( 1994 ); cf Hishon v. Kin g & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1 984) (holding th at existence of First
Amend ment protections of freedom of associa tion and expression do not preclude justifiable
govern ment regulatio n).
122 Scal es v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1 96 1); In re Alberto R. (People v. Albe rt o R.) ,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 -54 & n.5 (Ct. App. 1991).
123 See Kramer, supra note 96, at 895.
124 NAAC P v. Claiborne H ardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,919-20 & n. 55 (1982) ; Rizzo v. G oode.
423 U.S. 362, 373 -87 (1976); H ea ly v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972); Ke yishi an v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Ru sse ll, 384 U .S. 11 (1966); see also 16A A M. J uR. 2 o
Co nstiwtional Law§ 539 (1979) (noting "[i]t is now clear from a number of the Supreme Co urt 's
late r decisions involving freedom of association th at one may not be pr~sumed guil ty because of
the company he keeps") ; Kramer, supra no te 96, at 906 (collec tin g cases on gui lt by associatio n).
However, "[i)t should be noted tha t a distaste fo r guilt by associa ti on has not a lw ays bee n a
hallm ark of Supreme Court decisi ons." /d. For exa mple , in Adl er v. Board of Ed uc. , 342 U .S.
485 (1952) , the Cou rt upheld th e di sm issa l of a teacher, reasoning that "[f] rom tim e immemorial ,
one's reputation ha s been determined in part by the company he ke eps." !d. at 493; cj Korema tsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 218 (1944) (app rovin g deprivation of libe rti es because of
ancestry withou t any showing of individual partici pati on in illegal activity); id. at 237-38 (Mur phy, J. , di sse nting) (noting that inte rnment was based onl y o n general izatio ns abo ut the e ntire
gro up ).
125 458 U .S. 886 (1982).
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protest perceived racial injustice. 126 The me rch a nts sought and were
granted an injunction against 146 individuals to pre vent them from
co ntinuing their boycott. 127 Seventy-nine of these individua ls were
enjoined becaus e they regularly attended NAACP mee tings, and
twenty-two others we re enjoined because the black hats th ey wore
id e ntified th e m as protesters. 12 8
"The Court dissolved this injunction because it constituted civil li ability o n the basis o f associatio nal activity. 129 Th e Court reaso ned that
"[t]he First Amendment ... restricts the ability of th e State to impose
li ability on a n individual solely because of his association with another."1 30 The Court continued:
Ci vil lia bi lity ma y not be imposed m e re ly b eca use an individual belon ged to a group , some members of whi ch committ ed ac ts o f vi o le nce.
Fo r liability to be imposed by reason of associati o n alon e . it is necessary
to esta bli sh that th e group itse lf possessed unlawful goa ls and th at th e
indi vidu a l he ld a spec ific intent to further those illegal aims. In this sensitiv e fi eld, th e Sta te may not employ means th a t broadl y sti tk funda me ntal personal libertie s when the e nd can be mo re narrowly
ach ie ved. 131

The Co urt proceeded to quote Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, lnc.: 132 " 'Still it is of prime importance that no
co nstitutional freedom, least of all the guarantees of th e Bill o f Rights,
be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening re ality.' " 1 3 3
The Court then concluded that attendance at NAACP me e tings and
the wearing of black hats were insufficient to prove the specific intent
to further an unlawful aim embraced by the group and thus were an
insuffici e nt factu al predicate for the injunction. 134
The refore , a person may be subject to an antigang injunction
without constituting guilt by association only if the facts sufficiently
establish that that person actively participated in the gang's illegal activities a nd had the specific intent to do so. Accordingly , cities should
be careful to enjoin only those persons whose level of participation
and specific intent justify their being subjected to the injunction. In
addition, courts should carefully scrutinize the m ethods used to d e termin e who is subj ected to the injunctions to ensure th a t the facts es tabli sh these elements.
!26
127
128
!29
130

!d. at 889. 908.
!d. at 889.
!d. at 897.
!d. a t 920.
!d. at 918-19.
l3 1 !d. at 920 (quo tations a nd footnote omitted).
!32 312 U.S. 287 (1941 ).
i 33 Claibome !iard•vare, 458 U.S. at 924 (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers , 3 12 U.S. a t 293).
134 !d. at 924 -26.
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The record of People ex rel. City Attorney v. Acuna 135 demonstrates the risk of impermissible guilt by association involved in determining against whom an antigang injunction should be imposed. In
Acuna, th e San Jose City Attorney looked to several factors in deciding whether a pe rson was a gang member and should be subjected to
the antigang injunction: (1) whether the person had admitted to membership in a specific gang; (2) whether the person bore a tattoo, wore
gang clothing, or was observed using gang hand signs; (3) whether the
person was named as a gang member by two or more other members
of the gang: (4) whether the p erson was an active participant in a
criminal street gang crime; (5) whether the person was id entified as a
gang member by a reli ab le informant; or (6) whether the person had
been observed associating with identified gang members two or more
tim es . 13 n
The factors us ed in Acuna offer little protection against unconstitutional guilt by association. For example, subjecting a person to an
injunction based on that person's being identified as a gang member
by him self or by another gang member is suspect. 137 As one expert
noted, "Be skeptical about what you hear, even if you get it directiy
from gang me mbers. (Gang members have lots of games to playwith themselves , with each other, with police or anybody else in authority, and with anybody who can possibly be 'impressed.')" 138
Moreover, the mere fact that a person identifies himself or herse lf
as a gang member does little to establish that his or her level of participation is active enough to support legal liability. 139 Gang experts
agree that there are different levels of participation in gangs, 140 and a
135 No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County June 28, 1993).
136 Defe nd ants ' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4 n.5, People
ex rei. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Co unty filed May 28,
1993). 1l1e risk of impermiss ible guilt by association is heightened by the fact that one of the
primary sources of thi s type of information o n gang members is so-called field identifica tion or
field inquiry (FI) ca rds, in which law enforce ment officers not e the circumstances of thei r contacts with suspected gang members. However, FI cards contain little information about what
circumstances led to the pe rson's identification as a gang mem be r and are often scre e ned by
offi cers who lack the proper experience a nd training to ensure the cards' accuracy. See id. at 4;
REIN ER, supra note 1, at 141. Thus. FI card s often lack the details ne cessary to determine the
al leged ga ng member's leve l of participation in ga ng acti vities.
137 Cf ln re Lincoln J. (Peop le v. Lincoln J. ), 272 Cal. Rptr. 852, 855-56 (Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that previous identification of self as a gang member to a police gang expert held insu fficient to es tablish gang membership und e r Cal iforn ia's Street Terrorism Enforcement an d Protection Act).
138 Jo an Moore . Gangs and Gang Violence: What We Know and What We Don't, in G AN G
VIOLENCE PR EVENTION 23, 23 (Alfredo Gonzalez eta!. eds., 1990).
139 See NAACP v. Claib o rn e Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 & n.55 (1982); Lincoln 1., 272
Ca l. Rptr. at 855-56.
14 0 Ruth Horowitz, Sociological Perspec!ives on Gangs: Conflicting Definirions and Concepts,
in G ANGS IN A~1ERICA, supra note 1, at 37, 45; REINER , supra note 1, at 40-44; Burrell , supra
note 1, at 750 & nn.45-46; Moore, supra note 138, at 28-31. In fact, th e District Attorney of Los
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pe rson may ide ntify himself of herself with a gang solely for recogniti o n, protection, or social purposes and never actively participate in
th e gang's illegal activities. 141 Given that the Constitution requires a
pe rson's active participation with the specific inte nt of furthering an
organization 's illegal aims before that person can be e njoin ed because
of his o r her membership in that organization, 142 a person's self-identifi ca ti o n as a gang member without more is insufficient to subject that
person to an antigang injunction.
A person's wearing of gang clothing or a gang-rel at ed tattoo is
also insuffici e nt to justify subjecting that person to a n antigang injuncti o n. 143 T he fa ct that nonmembers often experime nt with gang clothin gl-l4 and inactive gang members still bea r ga ng ta tt oos 145 m akes
b as ing a n injunction on such indicia pro bl e m a ti c. F urthermore , the
Supreme Court h eld in Claiborn e Hardware 146 that an ind ividual's
we aring o f apparel associated with an organization was constitutionally insuffici e nt to establish the level of pa rticip a ti o n in that organization 's illega l aims necessary for an injunctio n. 14 7 G ive n that h o lding,
courts should not find that having a gang tattoo or wearing gan g clo thing is sufficient to subject a person to an antigang injunction.
Nor should a person 's association with known gang members conclusively indicate that that person is an active participant in the gang's
criminal activities sufficient to justify subjecting th a t pe rson to an antigang injunction. 148 Just as attending NAACP meetings was held insufficient to justify the injunction in Claiborne Hardware, lawfully
associating with identified gang members should be held insufficient
to form the basis for an antigang injunction . 14 9
Angeles County has noted that its data base includ es a large number o f in active ga ng me mbe rs.
supra no te I , at 111. Unless loc al la w enforcement ve riti es that a person is still an active
me mbe r of the gang, using such databases to de te rmine who sh o uld be s ubj ect to antigang injunctions prese nt s se rious risks of guilt by pas t associati o n a nd would be unco nstituti o nal.
R E IN E R,

141

Burrell, supra not e I , a t 750 & n.4 8; Boga, supra note 20, at 486 -89.

See Claib orne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920 & n.55.
See Burre ll, sup ra note 1, at 754-55 (arguing that dressing like a gang me mbe r a nd ta ttoo in g a re no t co nclu sive of gang membership) ; Schultz. supra note 7, at 730 (questioning the use of
142
14 3

cl o thin g combin e d with skin color as a basis fo r concludin g that a pe rson is a gang m e mbe r).
144 REINER,

supra note 1, at 41.

145 Burre ll, supra no te 1, a t 755 n.65 .
146

458 U.S . 886 (1982).

147

ld. at 924-26.

14 8

See id.
See id. Thi s is pa rticularly tru e be ca use th e known ga ng me mbe rs' c rimin a l acts were

149

more th a n likely committ ed for th e pe rpetrators' own benefit ra ther than for the benefit o f the
gang as a whol e. See REI NER, supra no te I , at 55, 58; Burrell , supra note I , at 750; Moo re, supra
no te 5, at 38-39. Th e refo re , it is far fro m c le ar that eve n if a perso n associa te s with known gang
members. those oth er gang m embers' criminal activities should be attribut ed to th a t person. See
Claiborne Hard•wlre, 458 U.S. at 926-32.
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1l1e risk of guilt by association is particularly acut e in those cases
wh e re gangs are enjoined as unincorporated associations. 150 In cases
whe re named defe nd ants have been enjoined, a judge in th eo ry has
re vie wed the factual sufficiency of the case against each de fend ant.
Howeve r, in unincorporated- association cases, judges decide only
wh ether the e ntire gang should be enjoin ed, whil e th e decision
whether a particular person should be subject ed to th e injun ctio n li es
entire ly with expe rts in local police dep artme nts wit hout any further
judi cial review. 15 1 Thus in unincorporated -association cases, a perso n
m ay fac e co ntemp t-of-court charges without ever hav in g h is or he r
case subjected to an indepe ndent, judi cial dete rmina ti o n o f whether
th e po lice's determin atio n of gang membership was correct. 15 2
T his is not to say that gang me mbers can neve r be subjected to
anti gang injunctio ns without violating the Con stitution's pro hibiti o n
of gu ilt by assoc ia ti on. The problem is ens urin g that s uch inj uncti o ns
are o nl y ap pli ed to persons who m ee t the active participa tion a nd spe cifi c int ent requi rements m andat ed by th e Co nst itution . La w enforce ment aut horiti es sho uld take two ste ps to e nsure tha t ant igang
injunctions are applied to alleged gang membe rs in a const itutional
ma nner. First, in deciding who should be subj ected to such a n injunction , auth orities should employ a definition of ga ng m embership that
includes active participation and specific intent requirem en ts.
A lthough definin g gang membership has proven to be a difficult
task, t sJ many states have already developed such definitions in their
antigang statutes that have passed constitutional muster. For example, California 's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
(ST EP) Act154 contains a definition of gang membership that includes
b oth active participation and inte nt requirem e nts 155 which, as courts
t 50 See supra note 49.
See Jim H . Zamo ra , Police Begin Serving Cou rt Order ro Gang, L. A. TIME S. May 9, 1993 ,
a t B3 (Vall ey ed .). This relian ce on poli ce experts' opini o ns is pro ble mati c since courts hav e he ld
such o pini o ns a lon e a re insuffici e nt to esta blish a gang's pa rticip a ti o n in ill ega l activity. S ee In re
Lin co ln J . ( People v. Lincoln J. ), 272 Ca l. R p tr. 852, 855-57 (C t. App. 1990); In re Le la nd D.
(People v. Lelan d D. ), 272 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 -14 (Ct. App. 1990).
152 ·n1 is is pa rticul ar ly tro ublesome since und e r the collate ral bar rul e, by the tim e a vio lat ion
reac hes the conte mpt-o f-court s tage, the defendant is barre d from co ntes tin g e ith e r th e co nst ituti ona lity or the factual suffici e ncy of th e injuncti o n and is restrict ed onl y to the is sues of wh e ther
th e co urt had the jurisd icti on to issue the injun ctio n and wheth er the d e fe ndant kn o wingl y vio la ted it. See inf ra no te 280 a nd accompa nyin g tex t.
153 Robert A . De stro, G angs and Civil Rights , in G ANGS , supra note 1, at 277 , 280; 13urrell,
supra no te I , a t 748-50; Horowitz , sup ra note 140, at 43.
15-+ CAL PE NAL CoDE§§ 186.2 1-1 86.28 (Wes t Supp. 1994).
155 1l1e STEP Act defi nes a gang me mber as " [a]n y perso n who actively parti cipates in a ny
crim in al stree t gan g with kn ow le dge th a t its members e ngage in o r have e nga ged in a patt e rn of
cri mi nal ga ng act ivit y, a nd who wi ll full y prom o tes, furth e rs, o r assists !n a ny fe lo ni o us crimi na l
cond uct by members of that gang, " § 186.22(a), where a " patt ern of crim inal gang activity " is
de fin e d as th e com m ission , attempt , o r soli cit at ion of se ven spec ifi ed o ffens es , § 186.22(e) .
Oth e r stat es have adopted simi la r defin iti o ns. See, e.g. , GA . CODE A NN.§ 16-15-3 ( 1992); IowA
15 1
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have held, avoids guilt-by-association problems. 156 Cities pursuing antigang injunctions can similarly avoid guilt-by-association concerns by
incorporating these standards and only enjoining persons whose conduct satisfies these defmitions. 15 7
Tne second step law enforcement should take to avoid guilt-byassociation problems is to eschew enjoining gangs as unincorporated
associations and allow courts to review the factual sufficiency of the
claim against each defendant. 158 Moreover, to make these protections
effective, courts should scrutinize the factual suftlciency of the case
against each individual defendant to make sure that the defendant's
conduct satistled the requirements imposed by the definition of gang
membership. 159
B.

Freedom of Expression

The First Amendment of the Constitution states, "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." 160 The Supreme Court has
encapsulated the freedoms of speech and the press into the term
"freedom of expression." 161 This section analyzes whether antigang
injunctions violate gang members' freedom of expression, focusing on
the prohibitions against demanding entry and restrictions on wearing
gang insignia and using hand signs. 162 This analysis reveals that since
demanding entry constitutes speech representing a clear and present
CooE ANN. § 723A.1 (West 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:1404 (West 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.229 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.421 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 193.168 (Michie 1992); Act of Dec. 10, 1993, §§ 133, 141, 1993 Wis. LAws 98 (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 939.22(9), 941.38( l )(b)).
156 People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145-46 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Alberto R. (People v.
Alberto R.), 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1991); People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894,
902 (Ct. App. 1991).
157 If judges require municipalities to make a constitutionally sufficient evidentiary showing
for each gang member, just as is required for criminal sanctions such as the STEP Act. it is
possible that antigang injunctions will lose much of their attractiveness. However, cities m::~y
remain interested in antigang injunctions nonetheless since easier evidentiary burdens are only
one of many reasons that law enforcement agencies may prefer civil sanctions to criminal ones.
See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1345-48.
158 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware. 458 U.S. 886, 920 & n.55, 924-25 (1982).
159 See Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9-27, People ex rei. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed May 28.

1993).
160 U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
161 See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
162 First Amendment concerns raised by limitations on gang members' ability to associate

with one another have already been addressed in the discussion on freedom of expressive association. See supra part III.A.l. First Amendment concerns regarding the injunction provisions
ordering defendants not to annoy or harass residents will be addressed in the discussion concerning overbreadth. See infra part !V.B.
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danger, it is not protected by the First Amendment. However, this
analysis al so indicates that th e wearing of gang clothing is protected
by the First Amendment and that th e injunction term s restricting gang
attire will be found to violate th e gang membe rs' freedom of
ex pressiOn .

1. Prohibitions Agaim·r Demanding En try.- The injunction provtstons th at prohibit gang me mbers from demanding entry into residents' hom es constitute res triction s on th e a lleged ga ng members'
pure speec h and thus arc subj ect to the most exacting scrutiny. 1 6 3 The
standard of review for restrictions of pure speech turns on whether th e
res triction is content-based or conte nt-neutral. 104 Co ntent- based re strictions must be " narro wly drawn to se rve a compe lling state interes t" in order to be found constitutional. 165 Content-neutral
restrictions arc subj ected to less ri goro us sta ndards. 166 To de termin e
whe ther a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, courts look
first to wh ether the government ha s adopted the res triction without
reference to the content of the regulated speech. 167
163 Boos v. Ba rry, 485 U.S. 312 (1 988) . Th e First Amendm e nt pro vid es the g rea tes t protecti o n for pure speech , i. e., the spok e n a nd writt e n word. Ex pressive conduct rece ives a lesser
d eg ree of protec tion. See infra not es 174-84 and accompanying text.
164 Defenda nts and th e ir amici have a rgued th at antigang injuncti ons con stitute prior re stra ints and sho uld be subjec t to an eve n higher degree of scru tiny. Me mora ndum of Points and
Aut ho rities in Opposition to Motion for Prelimin a ry Injun cti o n at 27-29, Pe ople ex ref. Jones v.
Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Co un ty filed Aug. 19, 1993); Defend a nts' Opposition to Plaintiff 's Motio n fo r Preliminary Injuncti o n at 44-46, Awna (No. 729322 ) (fil ed May 28,
1993); Memora ndum of Po ints and Au thorities o f A micus C uria e ACLU in Opposi ti o n to Motion for Preliminary Injunctio n at 14 - 16, Peopl e v. Blythe St. Gang, No. LC 020525 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Los Ange les County fil ed Mar. 10, 1993). Howeve r, the Co urt in M adse n v. Wome n's Health
Ct r., Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), he ld that " [n)o t all injunctio ns whi ch may incid e nt all y affect
express ion ... a re ' prior rest raints ,' " particularl y whe re the injunction wa s based o n th e defendants' prior unl awful conduct and where the injun ct ion did not prevent th e defendants from express ing their message in other ways. !d. at 2524 n.2.
165 Barry, 485 U .S. at 321; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Pe rry Loca l Educators' Ass ' n , 460 U.S. 37, 45
( 1983 ). In practice, subj ec ting a regul a ti o n to thi s level of sc rutiny has bee n tantamou nt to finding it unconstitutional. See LAURE;-.J CE H. TRI BE, AMERI CAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2, a t
790 -92, § 12-8, a t 832-33, 836 -37 (2d ed. 1988).
166 If a rest rictio n is con te nt-neutra l an d th e foru m in qu estion is a public fo rum such as a city
stree t, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988), th e stand a rd of review de pe nds o n whether th e
res triction is a n o rdinance o r an injuncti o n. Co nt e nt-neutral ord inan ces may be held valid as a
reaso nable res triction on the time, pl ace , or mann er of speec h so long as th e y serve a significant
gove rnment interest and leave open adeq uat e al te rnative channels of commu nicati o n. Clark v.
Com munit y for C reative No nvio len ce, 468 U.S. 288, 293 ( 1984); see also Ward v. R ock Again st
Ra cism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Perry Educ. A ss'n, 460 U.S. at 45. Conte nt-neutra l injunction s
run greater risks of censo rship and di sc riminat o ry application than ordinances. Co nse quently ,
injunctions must "burde n no more speec h than necessary to se rve a significa nt government inter est " in order to be con stitutional. Madsen . 11 4 S. Ct. a t 2525.
167 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523; Ward , 49! U .S. at 791. The Court in Madsen rejected th e
argument th at all injuncti o ns are cont e nt-base d because th ey necessarily apply only to certain
people. Th e Co urt reasoned that it was that gro up of people's pas t action s that led to th e ir being
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However, the Court has defined certain categories of speech to
be unprotected by the First Amendment and has permitted governments to regulate those categories in a content-based manner. 16s
Words that pose a clear and present danger constitute one category o f
unprotecte d speech. 169 Under the clear and present danger tes t,
speech that advocates the use of force or crime can be regulated if it is
directed at inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce
such action. 170 The threat of illegal action must be truly imminent to
satisfy the clear and present danger test; advocacy of illegal action a t
an indefinite time in the future is not sufficient. 171
Since th e prohibitions against demanding entry re fer on the ir face
to th e content of the regulated speech, they are clearly content- base d
restrictio ns. However, the injunctions prohibit such demands because
gang members often evade arrest by forcing their way into peop le 's
ho mes. 172 Such de mands are directed at inciting the imminent lawless
actio n of evading arrest and are likely to produce such acti o n. Th erefo re, the speech these injunction terms restrict does pose a cle ar and
prese nt danger and can be regulated without violating the Fi rst
A me ndment.
2. R estrictions on Gang Clothing and Hand Signs.-In contrast,
the antigang injunction terms prohibiting the wearing of gang clothing
and the use of gang hand signs probably violate the gang members '
First Amendment rights. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has
held that regulations of pure speech, unless they restrict only categories of unprotected speech, must pass the most exacting scrutiny to be
held constitutional.l 73 However, the Court has generally allowed the
government greater latitude in restricting expressive conduct than it
has in restricting the written or spoken wordY 4 A s the Court stated
e njoin ed , not the court's hostility to the content of their protest. Any restriction on their speech
wa s " incide ntal" to their message. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24.
168 E. g. , Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1 942). Although government s can
regul ate th ese catego ri es of speech in a content-based manner, there re main lim itation s to th e
manner in which th ey regulate them. See R.A.Y . v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543-47
(1 992 ) (holding cities canno t selectively regulate speech based on hostilit y o r favoritism to wa rds
message eve n if speech is unprotected).
169 Brandenburg v. Ohi o, 395 U .S. 444 (1969). The oth er catego ries o f unprotected speec h
inclu de fighting wo rds, obscenity, libe l, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, and de famation , Beauharnais v. Illin ois, 345 U .S. 250 (1952).
1 70 Bran denburg , 395 U .S. at 447; D e nnis v. United Stat es, 341 U.S . 494 (1 951) .
17 1 H ess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); see also Watts v. United Sta tes, 394 U .S. 705
(1 969) (requiring go ve rnme nt to prove a tru e "threat" to the life of th e President fo r violation o f
statut e).
172 See supra pa rt !1.8.2.
173 See supra ;JOles 163- 67 and accompanying text.
174 Texas v. Johnso n, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
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in United Stmes v. O 'Brien, 175 " We cannot accept th e vie w that an apparentl y limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 's peech' when eve r
th e perso n engaging in th e co nduct intends thereby to express an
ide a. " 1711 Similarly , the Co urt reasoned in City of Dallas v. Stanglin: 177
"' [F)recdom of sp eech" me ans more than simply the right to ta lk a nd to
write. It is possible to hnd so me kernel of expression in almost eve ry
activit y a perso n und er takes -for exa mple , walking down th e street or
mee ting o ne 's fri ends at a shopping mall-but such a ke rn e l is not sufticient to bring th e acti vi ty within the protection o f the First
Ame nd me nt. 178

To de termin e whether conduct is suffici ently express ive to fail
within the First A me ndm en t' s protection, th e Co urt appli es the two part test first ar ticul ated in Spen ce v. Washington. 17 9 Under that test
th e Co urt evalu ates whether " an intent to convey a particul arized
message was prese nt' ' and whe the r " the likelihood was grea t th at th e
m essage woul d be und e rstood by th ose who viewed it. " 180 If th e con duct res tri cted by the regul a tion is found to be express ive under
Spen ce and the regulation takes the form of an ordinance, the sta nd a rd of rev iew turns on whether th e regul atio n is relate d to the su ppression of speech. 1s 1 If related to the suppression of speech , th e
regulati o n will be subjected to the same scrutiny as pure speech. 18 2 If
unrelated to the suppression of speech , the less stringent standard anno unced in United States v. O 'Brien 183 applies.1 84
39 1 U.S. 367 (1968).
!d. a t 376.
177 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
178 !d. at 25.
179 418 U. S. 405 (1974); see also Texas v. Joh nson, 491 U .S. 397, 404 (1 989) (rei tera tin g Spence
tes t).
180 Spence, 418 U.S. a t 410-11.
181 John son. 491 U. S. at 403.
182 !d. For a description of the level of scrutiny for pure speech, see supra notes 163-67 a nd
accompan ying text.
183 391 u.s. 367 (1968 ).
184 l ohman . 491 U .S. at 403 ; cf JeffreyS. Trachtman, No te, Porn ography, Padlocks, and Prio r
Res1rain1s: Th e Conslillllional Limils of lize Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U . L. REv. 1478, 1513- 18
(1983) (argu in g th a t O 'B rien sh o uld be applied to public nuisance injun ctions aga inst purveyo rs
o f obsce nit y) . It is a rgua ble that in th e Court in Madsen established the prope r sta nd a rd of First
Amendm e nt re view for injunct io ns regardle ss if the injunction provision s restri cted pure speec h
or expressive co nd uct a nd that O'Brien does not apply at all to injunctio ns. Th e anti-a bortio n
pro tests th a t gave rise to lYfadsen clea rly invo lved the core of th e First Amendment, a nd the fact
th a t the Court discussed th e applicability of tim e-space-m a nne r doctrine cl ea rly indicates that
the Co urt regarded the enj o ined activities as pure speech. However, it is unlikely that th e Court
would co nsid e r all acti viti es restr icted by injunctions to be pure speech because oth e rwise any
enjoin ed pa rty cou ld auto;n a tical ly challenge the injunction on First Amendme nt gro un ds a nd
invoke th e more rigorous st a ndard provide d in Madsen. The re fo re , courts are lik ely to cont inue
io ioliow the Johnson fram ewo rk with injunctions, a pplyi ng Spence as a threshold requirem e nt of
exp ress ive ness, evaluating whethe r the regul at ion was rel ated to th e sup press ion o f speech , and
applying Mads en if the reg ula ti o n was related to suppressi ng speech.
175

176
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It is unclear whether the wearing of symbolic attire such as gang
insigni a should be analyzed as pure speech or expressive conduct. 1S5
In the pre-Spence case of Tinker v. Des JV!oines Indep endent Community School District, 186 for example, three public school students were
suspend ed for wearing black armbands to protest American involvement in Vietnam. 187 Noting that " the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case " was "closely akin to 'pure speech,' " 188 the
Co urt invalidated the school's policy of banning such armbands as an
unjustified infringement upon free speech. 18 lJ Consequently , so me
courts have reasoned that the right to control one's appearance is pro tected by the First Amend ment. 19 0 However, other courts have disagreed, holding that one's perso nal appearance is not su ffic ientl y
expressive to receive First Amendment protection. 191 Th e Suprem e
Court has declined to resolve the split in authority, de nying certiorari
in numerous cases that presented the issu e. 192
185 See TRIBE , supra note 165. § 12-8, at 825-32 (no tin g the indeterminacy of the spc:ec h/con duct di stinction).
I 86 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
187 !d. at 504.
188 !d. at 505.
189 !d. at 514; see also U nited States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I, 16 (1989) (Marsha ll , J .. disse nting) (stating that what one wears is protect ed by th e right to free ex pre ssio n); Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that wearing a sign on th e back o.f a jacke t is prot ected by th e
First Amendment); Sch acht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (holding th at wearing military
uniforms is protected by the First Ame ndment). Other cases have sugges ted that the ri ght to
control o ne 's appearance is based o n th e libe rty assurance of the Due Process Clause. E.g.,
Z el le r v. D o nega l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ ., 517 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Ci r. 1975) : Breen v. Kahl. 419
F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Braxton v. Board o f Public
Instructi o n, 303 F. Supp. 958, 959 (M.D. Fla. 1969); see also Kell ey v. Johnson , 425 U.S. 238, 244
(1976) (assuming without decidin g that personal appea ra nce falls within libe rty of Fo urtee nth
Amendment and noting lack of guidance provided by precedents); id. at 249 (Powe ll , J. , concurrin g) (finding no implication of majority opinion as to wheth e r personal appearance falls within
liberty of th e Fourtee nth Amendment); id. a t 251 (Marshall. J., di ssen ting) (arguing substan ti ve
due process protects against regul ation of what ci ti zens may o r may not wear).
190 E.g., Kelley, 425 U.S. at 251 n.2 (Marshall, J. , dissenting): Jeglin ex rei. Jeglin v. Sa n Ja cin to
Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (C.D . Ca l. 1993): Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v.
Trustees of Big Shady Indep. Sch. Dist. , 817 F. Supp. 13 19, 1334 (E.D. Te x. 1993). rem anded
without opinion , 20 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1994): C hurch v. Boa rd of Educ. , 339 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); see also Rich a rds v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 128 1 (1st Cir. 1970) (recogniz in g there may
be an ele me nt of exp ression in one 's appea rance); Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036 (reaso nin g appearance may be within penumbra of First Am e ndme nt ); John D. Ingram & Elle n R. Domph, Th~
Right to Govern One's Personal Appearance, 6 OKLA. CtTY U. L. R Ev. 339, 343 & n. l2 ( 1981)
(a rguing that be tter re asoned cases recogni ze a co nst ituti o nal right to govern o ne' s pe rso nal
a p pearance).
191 See, e.g., Bishop v. Co law, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally W.E. Shi pley,
A nn ota ti o n, Validity of Regulation by Pttblic School Authorities as to Clo1hes or Personal Ap·
pearance of Pupils , 14 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1967 & Supp. 1993) (co llecting ri ght to appeara nce cases
that arose in a schoo l co ntext).
192 See Ingram & D o mph, supra note 190, at 345-46 & n.25 (li sting twelve cases concerning
students' ri ght to control their hair le ngth in which cert iora ri was denied); see also Hol sappie v.
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Regardless of whether one's appearance should be considered
pure speech or expressive conduct, the regulation of the wearing of
gang insignia and the use of hand signs should be found unconstitu tio nal. If the wearing of gang attire and the use of hand signs are
found to be pure speech, it will almost certainly be considered a content-based restriction, since they clearly re fer to the co ntent of th e
speech. 193 Mo reover, in Cohen v. California, 194 th e Court held that
arresting a person for wearing a message on his clothing constituted a
content-based restriction and was invalid. 195 Since injunct io n provisions pro hibiting gang attire and hand signs simil arly pe na lize the
wea ring of m essages, like the statute in Cohen , they should be considered conte nt-b as ed and presumptively in va lid. T nerefore, unless the
speech restricted by the regulation is dete rmin ed to fall withi n one of
the categories of speech unprotected by the First Amen d m e nt , it will
be su bj ected to strict scrutiny and almost certainl y be fo un d
unconstitutiona\. 196
It is unlikely that courts will find that gang ins ign ia a nd hand
signs fa ll into one of the categories of unprotected speech . 197 First,
gang insignia and hand signs probably do not constitute fightin g
words. 198 Fighting words are words of slight mo ra l va lue whi ch "by
Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th C ir. ) (per curiam), cert. denied, 41 9 U.S. 90 1 (1974). Som e courts have
interpreted the Su p reme Court's re fu sa l to address th e issue as an indi cat ion th at th e issue is no t
o ne of constitu ti ona l magnitud e. R oyer v. Board of Educ .. 365 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ohio Ct. App.
1977); cf Faga n v. National Cas h R egis ter Co., 481 F.2d 1115 , 111 9 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasoning in
sex discrimination case th at hai r length does not prese nt a federal qu es tion ); Ma ssie v. Henry,
455 F.2d 779, 786 n.6 (4th Cir. 1972) (Boreman, J ., dissenting) (reasoning that Supre me Court 's
refusal to grant cert iorari on th e iss ue indicates lack of importance).
Th e disagreem ent on the issue has unsu rpri singly spawn ed extensive commentary. See, e.g.,
ingram & Oomph, supra note 190; Lynda M. Gran din et: i, Note , Twenty -Five Years Later:
Schools and School Districts-Discipline of Students-Commiuee May Compel a "Proper Ha ircut" as Part of Mode of Dress, 25 NEw ENG. L. R Ev. 215 (1990). For a list of 10 oth e r such
co mm entaries, se e John Dingess, Note, Ke lley v. Johnso n: A Crew Cur Approach to Liberty, 10
Sw. U. L. R Ev. 137, 142 n.45 (1978).
193 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
194 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
195 /d. at 18, 26.
196 !d. at 24; see also supra note 165 and accompan ying tex t. Even if the res trictions on gang
attire and hand si gns are regarded as content-neutral, they sti ll are unlikely to pass co nstit uti onal
scr uti ny. A lth o ugh such restriction s do serve significant government interests. see sup ra note 108
and accomp anyin g text , given the broad scope of th e injun ction s a cour t could easi ly fin d th at
th ey burden no more speech than necessa ry, Madsen v. Women's Hea lth O r. , In c ., 114 S. Ct.
2516, 2528-30 (1 994) (holding th at injunction terms affec tin g private property, banning a ll
''images obse rvable ," and prohibiting protesters from approac hin g ot he rs burde ned more speech
th an necess ary).
197 See supra notes 168-71 and acco mpan yin g tex t. Two of the ca tegories of unprotected
sreech, obscenity and li be l, are not implicated and wiil not be discussed.
193 Cha plinsky v. New H ampshire, 315 U.S. 568. 572 (1942). No te tha t the fi ghting wo rds
doctrine has not been used to uphold a regulati on since Fein er v. New York, 340 U.S. 31 5 (1951) ,
and comme nt ators have begun to questi on its vitality, see, e.g., Mu rphy, supra not e 22, at 1351.
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their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedia te
breach of the peace ." 199 To be fighting words, it is not e nou gh that
they make listene rs a ngry ; they must actually incite ot hers to viole nce ,200 and unless an onlooker could reasonably interpre t the words
as a d ire ct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fi sticuffs, they
can not be considered fighting words .201 Although gang att ire a nd
hand signs do at times provoke violence,2°2 th ey do not invariably
have th is effect, and onlookers appear to und e rstand th at their principal purpose is to express affiliation and not to incite violence _2o3
Tr1e refore, courts will probably conclude that ga ng clothing and hand
signs do not constitute fighting words.
Similarly, co urts are unlikely to hold that gang clothing and hand
signs const itute speech that represe nts a clear and present d a nge r. As
noted earlier, speec h re presents a clea r and present dange r if it is directed at inciting imminent lawless action and is like ly to produce such
action; 204 in addition, the lawless action advocated must be more than
a general ized threat of future action. 205 Since gang membe rs wear
gang clothing a nd use hand signs primarily to indica te a ffiliati on and
not to incite violence,2° 6 a nd the clothing a nd ha nd signs are a t wo rst a
generalized threat of action rather than a specific incitem e nt to commit violence ,2 07 they should not be regarded as speech that represents
However , th e Co urt ha s neve r formally ove rrul ed the fi ghtin g wo rds d oct ri ne, a nd language in
rece nt opin ions indicates that the d octrine is still applica ble . See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529
(s uggesti ng that injun cti o n provision wo uld have been valid if p ro tes te rs ' speech had co nsti tuted
fi ghting words); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul , 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) (sugges tin g that hate speec h stat u te banning a ll fi ghtin g words might be constitutional); Te xas v. John son, 491 U .S.
397,409 (1989) (discuss ing applicability of fi ghting words doctrine); see also id. a t 430-31 ( Re hn quist. C.J ., dissenting) (e xpress ing willingness to a ppl y fi ghtin g words doctrine).
19 9 Chaplinsk y, 3 15 U.S. at 572.
200 Terminiello v. C hica go , 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (ho lding speech must be '' show n like ly to
prod uce a clear and prese nt d anger o f a se rious substantive ev il that rises far above public inconvenie nce . annoyance, o r unrest" to constitute fighting wo rds).
201 Johnson , 491 U.S. a t 409; cf B u tts v. Dall as Ind ep. Sch. Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5 th C ir. 1971)
(ho ld ing th a t wearing a rm ba nds does not constitute fighting wo rd s).
202 See Burke, supra note l, a t 519; Murphy, supra note 22, a t 1352 & n.1 93.
203 St'e Murph y, sup ra no te 22, a t 1329-30, 1351; Glen Justice, The Uniform of Peace!: A Dress
Code in Long Beach Could Inspire Other Sch ools that Fear Gang Violence, L.A . Ti ~IES, Fe b. 17.
1994, a t E1 (home e d. ) (qu o ting th e Exe cutive Dire cto r of the National Associat io n of Eleme ntary Schoo l Prin cipals as qu estio ning whether regulatin g attire ad d resses vioience): see aiso supra
no tes 139- 41 and accompanying text. In fact, any suggesti o n that wearin g ga ng attire necessari ly
provokes vio le nce is belied by the fact that nonga ng members ofte n wear ga ng attire . See REI N ER, sup ra note I , a t 41 (reporting that pre-ga ng children begi n expe rim en ti ng with gang attire
and sy mbol s as early as the seco nd grade); see also sup ra no tes 143 -45 and accom panyin g tex t.
204 See supra note 170 a nd acco mpanying text.
205 See supra note 171 and acco mpanying text.
206 See supra not es 139-4 1 and accompa nying text.
207 See Bu rk e, supra note I , a t 520; Mu rphy , supra note 22, at 1330, 1351. Again , a ny suggest io n th a t wearing ga ng attire necessa ril y provok es violence is be li e d by th e fact tha t non-ga ng
m em be rs wear ga ng a ttire. See supra notes 143-45 a nd accom pa nyin g te xt.
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a clea r and presen t danger. Thus, if the wearing of gang clothing and
the us e of hand signs are treated as pure speech, they sho uld not be
regarded as unp rotected speech , and antigang injunction provisions
restricting the we aring of gang clothing and the use of hand signs
should be re garded as pres umptively invalid.
Cou rts will re ach the same conclusion even if the wearing of gang
insignia and th e use of ha nd signs are an alyzed as express ive cond uct
rath er than pure speech . As an initial matter, courts should ho ld that
t he \ve aring of gang attire and the use of hand signs a re suffic ie ntl y
exp re ssive und er the Spence test to be protected by th e First A m e nc!ment,208 beca use ga ng clothing and hand signs probably send a particu larized message of affiliati o n likely to be und e rstood b y peo pl e
obse rving them. 209 Thus , th e wea rin g of gang insig nia and th e usc of
gang han d signs are likely to be sufficiently expressive to fall wi t hin
the ambit o f th e First Ame ndm ent.
F urt hermore, courts wi ll likel y find th at the prohibition of ga ng
clothing and hand signs in antigang injunctions are related to the suppression of spe ech and thus are presumptively invalid. In Texas v.
Johnson, 210 the Court conside red whether a statute prohibiting fl ag
burning was related to th e suppression of speech. 211 Th e State
claimed th at one of th e purposes of the statute was to preve nt
breaches of th e peace. The Court he ld that since the fla g burnin g itse lf was insufficient to constitute a breach of the peace, the only way
the State's assert ed interest was implicated was by focusing on th e
impact the flag burning had on th e audience. 21 2 However, in focusing
o n the like ly communicative impact of the conduct , the inte rest be came related to th e suppression of speech, subjecting the restrictio n to
strict scrutiny. 213
Similarly, a ntiga ng injunctions that prohibit the wearing of ga ng
clothing and the use of hand signs should be deemed related to th e
suppression of speech and subjected to strict scrutiny. Just as the fla g
burning by itself did not constitute a breach of the peace in Johnson,
the we aring of gang clothing and the use of hand signs by th ems e lves
do not harm anyone directly and do not pose a sufficient thre at to th e
public health , safety, or morals to constitute a public nuis ance. As in
208
209

See supra not es 179-80 and accompanying text.
Burke. supra not e J. at 5 16 (no tin g that gan g clothing clearly sa tisfies th e fir st pro ng of th e
S/;en ce te st an d a rgua bly satisiies the seco nd prong as well); see also Be tts v. McCaughtry , 827 F.
Supp. 1400, 1407-08 (W.O. Wis. 1993) (hold ing that clo th ing choices a re expressive conduct
withi n th e Sp ence test; upholdir;g regul a tion of clo thin g ch o ices in pr ison o n o th e r gro und s) ,
aff'd IVi!lrout opinion. 19 F. 3d 21 (7 th Ci r. 1994).
21 0 491 U.S . 397 (1989).
211 !d. a t 407-09.
212 !d. a t 408.
2i 3 !d. a t 408- 09 . 411-1 2; see also R.A.V. v. C it y of St. Paul , 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1 9Y2 ); Boos
v. Barry, 482 U.S . 3 12, 321 (1988) .
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Johnson, this lack of direct impact on the public reveals that the rea!
interest behind the regulation is the impact that the prohibited activity
will have on the surrounding community. Therefore, as in Johnson,
courts are likely to conclude that this interest is related to the suppression of speech. Since gang clothing and hand signs do not fall within a
category of unprotected speech, 214 injunction provisions restricting the
wearing of gang clothing and the use of hand signs should be found to
violate the First Amendment. 2 15

C.

Right to Travel

Antigang injunctions should not be found to be unconstitutional
restrictions on gang members ' right to travel. The existence of a right
to travel has been acknowledged at le ast since Shapiro v. Tlz ompson.216 While the Court has held th a t the right to travel includes both
interstate and internationa l travel ,217 th e Court has d eclined to de termine whe ther this right extends to intrastate travel, 2 1S and the circuits
have split over the issue. 219
Even if the right to travel includes the right to intrastate travel,
like most constitutional rights , it is subj ect to reasonable limitation.no
Accordingly, courts have upheld te mporary curfews and other restric21 4

See supra notes 197-207 a nd accompanying text.

215 But see Charles Mount, Judge Upholds Ban on Gang Insignias , CHI. TR!B. , Sept. 27 , 1994,

metro northwest sec., at 3 (northwest sports final ed. ) (reporting that judge uph e ld ordinance
banning gang insignia and hand signs agai nst First Amendment challenge). Oth e r cases ha ve
upheld restrictions on gang attire in the rest ri cted enviro nments of priso ns and schoo ls where
greater limits on First Amendment rights a re allowed. E.g., Betts , 827 F. Supp. at 1407-08
(prison); Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(schoo l).
216 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); See also Me morial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cou nty, 415 U.S. 250. 254
& n.7 (1974). The Court has declined to specify the textual basis for this right. Shapiro, 394 U .S.
a t 630-3 1; see also Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 258 -70 (3d Cir. 1990) (reviewing tex tual
bases for right to travel).
217 E.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31 (interstate travel); Aptheker v. Secretary of Stale, 378
U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964) (international travel).
218 Memorial Hasp., 415 U.S. at 255-56.
219 Compare Lwz, 899 F.2d at 268-69 (holding that substan ti ve due process prot ects th e right
to "move freely about one's neighborh ood o r town") and King v. New Roch elle Mun. H o us.
Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It would be meaningless to describe the right to trave l
between states as a fundam e nt al precept of persona l libe rty a nd not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state. ") . cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (l97 l) with Wardwell
v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976) (rejecting extension of ri ght to t ravel to
intrast ate trave l) . See generally Tracy Maclin , The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The
Fo!lrth Amendment on the Streets , 75 CoR :--J ELL L. REv. 1258, 1260-64 ( l990) (reviewing cases
discussing ri ght to intrastate trave l). Regardi ng Ca lifo rnia law, see In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr.
562, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (" We co nclude that the right to intrastate tra vel (wh ich in clud es
intramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by th e Un it ed States and Ca liforn ia Con stitution s. Such a right is implicit in the conc ep t of a democratic soc ie ty and is one of th e attrib utes of personal libe rty under co mmon law." ).
2 20 See LlltZ, 899 F.2d at 269-70.
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tions on movement during times of emergency. 22 1 Conversely, a restriction t hat, in light of the asserted governmen ta l interests,
unreasonably infringes upon an individual's freedom o f movement is
not justified.222
In Lutz v. City of York, 223 the Third Circuit considered the constitutionality of an ordinance outlawing "cruising. " 2 2 4 The court first
concluded that the right to travel do es encompass the right to trave l
intrastate, basing the right in substantive due process. 22 5 However,
the court then eschewed the strict-scrutiny test traditionally ap plied to
substantive due process cases, fashioning instead a standard of review
similar to that employed in reviewing time, place , and manne r restrictions of free speech. 22 6 Because the ordinance se rve d a significant
governme nta l interest, was limited in geographic scope, and allowed
ample alternative routes to travel about the town , th e court upheld
the ordinance's constitutionality as a reasonabl e restriction on that
right to travel. 227
If the right to travel is found not to include the right to travel
intrastate, then the antigang injunctions' restrictions on local movement pose no constitution al problems. However, even if the right to
travel is found to include the right to travel intrastate , the injunctions'
restrictions on local movement, like the ordinance in Lutz, should be
he ld to constitute a reasonable restriction on that right. As in Lutz,
the restriction on local travel in question does serve the significant
governmental interest of abating public nuisances. 22 8 The injunctions,
like the ordinance in Lutz, are also limited in geographic scope. And
2 21 E. g.. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8 1, 95, 98 -99 (1943) (holdin g wartime curfew
fo r Japanese-Ame ricans was reasonable); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488. 492-95 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding juvenile curfew legitimate restriction of free dom of mo vem e nt) . cert. denied, 114 S. C t.
2134 (1994); Lutz , 899 F.2d at 269-70 (holding cruising ban was a reasonable restriction on tim e,
place , and manner of right to travel) ; United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1971)
(holding curfew following student riots was reasonable), cert. denied , 404 U.S. 943 (1971 ); In re
Pedro Q. (People v. Pedro Q.), 257 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (n o tin g in dicta that
we ll-tail o red ge ographic probation restrictions on travel are co'lstitutional). Fo r a discussion o f
the constitutio nality of juve nile curfews, see Not e , Juvenile Curfew Ordinan ces and the Con stiiLItion , 76 MtcH. L. R Ev. 109 (1977); see also id. at 11 3 n.6 (li sting oth e r suc h comm e ntary). For a
more th eoretical treatment, see Note, Juv enile Curfews and Gang Violen ce: Exiled on Alain
Streer, 107 1-L-\R V . L. R Ev. 1693 (1994).
2 22 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,225-26 (1 944) (R o bert s, J .. di ssentin g); Peopl e
v. C o ntinola , 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 228-29 (Cal. App. De p't Super. Ct . 1993) ( re versing con victi o ns for violating curfew following Rodney King ve rdicts because prohibiting "me re prese nce "
o n th e street was not a reaso nable restriction); cf Whir e, 158 Cal. Rptr. a t 566 (fmding probati o n
term that prohibited being in a designated area anytim e da y or night too harsh and oppress ive) .
2 2 3 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
2 2 4 !d. at 256.
225 !d. at 268.
2 26 !d. at 269; see aiso supra note 166.
2 27 Lwz, 899 F.2d at 270.
2 2 8 See supra not e 108 and accompanying text.

246

l

l'

1
l

,,i
'I
i

i

I
l
'i
1

l

,j

·!

-1
'

~

1

J
l

Constiwtiona!ity of Enjoining Streer Gangs

89:212 (1994)

lastly, since the injuncti ons only impose a limited curfew and prohibit
climbing trees, standing on rooftops, passing through walls , and o ther
limited act ivities,2 29 the restrictions still allow the enjoined parti es
myriad ro utes to trave l a round the area. Therefore , even if a right to
intrastate tr ave l is found, it is likely that the restrictio ns imposed by
the antigang injunctions, like th e ordinance in Lutz, will be found to
be constitutionally permissible re strictions on the right to travel in
li ght of the circumstances. 230
Thus, except for th e provisions restricting the wearing of gang insignia and the use of hand signs, antigang injunctions do no t appear to
violate defe ndants ' substantive constitutional rights. They do not infringe on the defendants' freedom of expressive or intima te association. F urthermore, the pro hibitions against demanding entry
probably fa ll wit hin a category held to be unprotected by th e freedom
of expression. Lastly, gang members' constitutional ri ght to trave l
might not be implica te d, and even if it is , its infringeme nt is justified
by the significance o f the governmental interests in restricting it and
the li mite d scope of the restriction. However, courts should scrutinize
th e evide nce about each and every de fe ndant in order to avo id any
guilt-by-association problems, being careful to apply a stand a rd that
requires that the de fendants have the specific intent and the level o f
participation in the gang's nuisance creating activities required by the
Co nsti tution.
IV.

Yo m

FOR VAGUENEss AND OvERB RE ADTH

In additi on to the possibility that the antigang injunctions violate
the alleged gang members' substantive constitutional rights, de fe ndants and their amici have consistently challenged antigang injunctio ns
as void for vagueness and as overbroad infringe ments on First
Amendment rights, and the courts that have reviewed antigang injunctions' constitutionality have taken diametrically opposed positio ns
on overbreadth and vagueness issues.23 1 This Part will first an alyze
229 See supra part II. B.4.
230 The Lu1z cou rt 's app li catio n of tim e-pl ace -m a nner d octrine to the right to tra vel is novel.
H oweve r , even if cou rts do not follow th e Lutz court 's application of thi s doctr in e , th ey wi ll
like ly fashion a similar test of a restrictio n's reaso na ble ness and will like ly up ho ld the reg ulat ion.
See supra no tes 98 -1 07 a nd accompanying text.
23 1 Mem o ra ndum of Poi nts and Aut hori ti es in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injun cti on at 24-27, Peop le ex rei. Jones v. Amaya, No. 713223 (Ca l. S uper. Ct. Orange Coun ty f·iJ e d
Aug. 19, 1993); Su pplemen ta l Brief of Amicus C uri a e ACLU in Oppositi o n to Request fo r Prelim inary Injunctio n at 4 -5, 7-8, People v. B lyth e St. Gang , No. LC 020525 (Ca l. Supe r. C t. Los
Ange les C ounty fil e d Mar. 26, 1993); Me mo rand um o f Points and Authoriti es of Amic us C uriae
ACLU in Opposition to Mo ti o n fo r Pre limi na ry Injunctio n a t 18-22, Blythe S1. Gang (No. LC
020525) (filed Ma r. 10, 1993) ; D e fend ants' Opposi ti on to Plaintiff's Motion fo r Prelimi na ry Injunction at 39-49, People ex rei. Ci ty Attorney v. Acu na, No. 729322 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Santa Clara
County file d Ma y 28, 1993); see supra no tes 46, 52 a nd acco mpanying te xt.
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vvhe th er certain categori es of antigang injunction terms are void fo r
vagueness and will then discuss whether these types of terms are overbroad and thus infringe ments of th e alleged gang m emb e rs' constituti onal rights. Sinc e the Court and comm entators view th ese doctrines
as closely related,2 32 the vagueness and overbreadth issues will be di scussed together.
The pro visions that prohibit demanding e ntry, res trict local
mo vement, and rest rict the wearing of gang insigni a and th e us e of
ha nd signs, while raising other constitutional questi o ns, do no t su ffe r
from lack of definit e ness and satisfy the vagueness requirements of
the Due Process Clause .233 The preceding analysis has also already
indicated that overbread th analysis is in appropriate fo r those provisio ns since dem anding entry is not protected by the First Amendme nt,
the res trict io ns in gang attire and hand signs are facia lly invalid und e r
th e Firs t Ame ndment, and the ri ght to travel does not implicate th e
First A mendme nt at alJ.2 34 Therefore , this section will focus o n th e
provisions limiti ng defendants' association with other ga ng members
and prohibiting defe ndants from anno ying or harassing reside nts.
A.

Restrictions on Associating with Other Gang Members

CD1e antigang injunctions' restrictions on associating with other
gang membe rs pose serious vagueness and overbreadth concerns.
Under the void-fo r-vagu e ness doctrine, the Due Process Clause of th e
Fo urteen th Amen dm ent requires that statutes and injunctions be suffici ently specific so that people have notice of what conduct is prohibite d .235 To survive a vagueness challenge, a restriction must be
sufficiently definite that a person of ordinary intelligence can under232 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n. 8 (1 983); Keyis hi an v. Board o f Rege nts ,
385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S . 415, 433 (1963).
233 Co mmentators ha ve argue d th at wh at co nsti tutes gang reg alia can be ha rd to defin e and
th a t a general ized ban on gang regali a wou ld thus be vo id for vag ueness. E. g., Burke, sup ra note
1, at 524-25; James A. Maloney, Commen t, Constitutional Prob lem s Surrounding the Implem en tation of ''Ami- Gang" Regulations in the Public Schools, 75 MARO. L. R Ev . 179, 187 (1991 ).
H o wever, clea r specification of what clo thi ng co nstitute s ga ng rega li a can cure these vaguene ss
co ncern s. See Murphy , sup ra note 22, at 1356; Mount. supra note 215. Since the Avalos a nd
Awna inj uncti ons li mit themse lv es to attire bearing th e gang's name or initi als, see supra part
ll. B.J, th ey ofk r cle arer standa rds for determining what is p roh ibi ted by th e inj unc tion than th e
situation discussed by th ese co mmentators, and the argum e nts lose their force.
234 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 453 (1939); Schmidt v. Lessard , 414 U .S. 47 3, 476
(1974); Inte rn atio nal Longsho remen's A ss ' n, Local1291 v. Phil adel phia Marin e Trade A ss'n , 389
U.S. 64 , 74 -76 ( 1967); see Che h, supra no te 20, at 1406 n.434 . The voi d- fo r- vague ne ss challen ge
is par ti cular ly im portant in th e case o f anti ga ng injunctions because it is one of th e few co nstitutio nal cl aims that is not precluded at th e co nt e mpt of court stage by the co ll ate ral ba r rule . See
infra not e 280 and acco mp anying text.
235 See supra parts !ll.B.1 -2. III.C; see aiso U nited States v. Sale rn o, 481 U.S. 739.745 (1967)
(stating tha t overb rea dth doctri ne only appli es to th e First Amendment). 8111 see A pt heker v.
Secretary of State . 378 U.S. 500. 505 (1 964) (apply in g overbrea dth doct rin e to ri ght to trave l).
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stand what is prohibited. 236 The re striction must also provide criteria
specific enough to discourage arbitrary enforcement. 237 These terms
need not be defined with mathematical precision; reasonable certainty
is sufficie nt to satisfy the mandates of du e process.Z 38
Historically, antigang measures have been particularly vulnerable
to vagueness attacks on both notice and arbitrary e nforcement
grounds. In Lan z etta v. New Jers ey ,23 9 for example , the Court conside re d a statute stating that "[a]ny perso n ... known to be a m ember of
any gang consisting of two or more persons, wh o has been convicted
at least three times of being a dis orderl y pe rson, or who has been
co nvi cted of any crime ... is declared to be a gangste r" and was punishabl e by fin e or imprisonment. 2 40 Th e Court he ld that th e phrase
.. consisting of two or more persons " was in sufficient to de fin e the
te rm " gang." 241 Therefore, the Court held th a t the statute was void
for va gue ness because it failed to gi ve suffi cient notice o f what activity
was prohibited and reversed the defendant's conviction. 2 42
Th e absence of a definition of gang membership also ra ises
proble ms of arbitrary enforcement. 24 3 As noted earlier, law enforce ment officials and scholars have been un able to formulate uniform crite ri a for determining gang membership.244 In the absence of such
cl ear criteria, judicial officers are not provided with any specific standards for determining when a violation of the injunctions has
occurred. 245
Thus, unless the provisions in antigang injunctions prohibiting defendants from associating with other gang members are carefully
worded, they may be vulnerable to vagueness challenges. For exam23 6 Ko /ender, 461 U.S. at 357-61; Lan zetta, 306 U.S. at 45 3.
237 Ko lender, 461 U .S. at 360-61; Papachristou v. City of Jackso nvill e, 405 U.S . 156, 170-7 1
( 1972 ).
23 8 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
23 9 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
2 40 !d. at 452.
2 41 !d. at 453-55. The Court also expressed se rious doubts a bout the con stitut ion a lity o f the
expressi o n " known to be a membe r" o n vagu e ne ss grounds. !d. at 458. Bw see Madse n v. Wome n' s Health Ct r. , Inc., 114 S. Ct. 251 6,2530 (1994) (holding e nj o ining th ose actin g " in conce rt"
wi t h named defend a nts not vague).
242 Lan zerta, 306 U.S. a t 453-58.
2 43 See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing the specia l ri sk of di sc rimin a tory a pplica ti o n pose d
by inj un cti o ns); see also supra notes 134-52 and acco mpan ying tex t.
244 See supra not es 1, 153 and accompanying te xt.
2 45 TI1e risk of arbitrary enforce me nt increases in those cases whe re th e ga ng was e nj o in ed as
a n unin co rpora ted association rather than as indi viduall y na med defe ndants. See supra notes 49,
151 and accomp a nying text. Unlik e in named-d efendant cases, wh e re a court reviews wh e th e r
an injun cti o n sho uld be se rved upon a particular pe rson, in unin corpora ted- associ ati o n cases,
po lice ga ng experts decide upon whom to se rve inj uncti o ns. See sup ra no tes 49, 151 a nd accompa nying te xt. Thus , in unincorpora ted-associatio n cases , the poss ibilit y of ar bitrary enfo rce me nt
a ppe a rs in the decision to subj ect a person to th e inj un cti o n as well as the det e rmin a ti o n of
whe ther a person has viol a ted the injuncti o n.
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pi e, th e provision in th e A cuna injunction prohibiting de fe nd ants from
"s tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gath erin g or appearing anywhere
in public view with .. . any other know n [ga ng] me mbe r " 2 46 lacks a
clear definition of gang m embership and thu s p oses th e same notice
problems as th e sta tute in L anzetta. Like the statute in Lanzetta,
th ese provisions leave the defendants guessing whether a person with
whom th ey are standin g or congregating is a gan g m e m be r within the
m e aning of the injuncti on. 2 47 Moreover, the absence of a sp ecific definition of gang membership makes th e provision vuln e rab le to arbitrary enfo rce men t. The refore, the provisions banning defendants
fr o m associating with o ther gang members probably a re unconstituti o nall y vague .
Two adjustments wo uld mitiga te the vag ueness proble ms posed
by th e Awna injunction. 24 8 First, as in Acosta, the Acuna injunction
should limit its prohibition of associ ational activity to oth er named
de fendants. 249 By limiting this prohibition to a discrete li st of nam es,
th e provision more clea rly notifies defendants with whom th ey are
pro hibite d from appearing in public and is relatively unsusce ptible to
a rbitrary e nforce ment.
Alternatively, the mJunction should incorporate a pre-existing
statutory definition of gang m e mbership e ither on the face of the injunction itself or by judicial construction. 250 As noted earlie r, the Cal246 See Peo ple ex rei. City At to rn ey v. Acun a, No. 729322, slip op. at 2 (Ca l. Super. C t. Sa nta
Clara Co unt y Jun e 28, 1993) (order granting preliminary injuncti on) .
2 4 7 See Lanzeua, 306 U.S. at 455-57. Vagueness co nce rns in the Acuna injun cti o n are par ticularly acu te becau se its use of the "known" ga ng member langu age that th e Court fo und probl e ma tic in Lanzella . See supra not e 241; see also Farbe r v. Rochford, 407 F. Su pp. 529, 531 -32 (N.D.
Ill. 1975) (holdin g statute that prohibited "known" prostit utes from associa ting with othe r
known prostitutes or fro m loi teri ng around bars to be unconstitutionally vague); City of D e troit
v. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d 771 , 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (same).
248 Municipalities have also employed a third approach to avoid vague ness ch a llen ges by including a req uire me nt th at a defendant refuse a police order to di sperse before a ga ng member
ca n be liabl e for ass ociational activity. See Lisa A. Kainec, Comment , Curbing Gang R elared
Violence in America: Do Gang 1Hem bers Hav e a Conslirurional Righi ro Loirer on Our Srreers?,
43 CASE W. REs. L. REv . 65 1, 664-66 (1993) (concluding that inclusion of dispersa l req uireme nt
in C hicago ga ng- loitering ordin ance satisfi es vagueness challenge). However, it is fa r fro m clear
th at such a dispe rsal req uireme nt is sufficie nt to protect such a regul a ti on from co nstitutio nal
attac k. Cf No rth ern Va . Cha pt er, ACLU v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Su pp. 324, 325, 328 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (holdin g drug loite rin g statute th at included specific inte nt req uireme nt to be unconstitutiona lly ove rbroad) .
2 4 9 E.g., Peo ple ex rei. Fletcher v. Acosta, No. EC 010205, slip op. at 4 (Ca l. Supe r. Ct. Los
Angel es Cou nty Nov. 2, 1992) (o rd e r granting preliminary injunction) (prohibiting defendants
from "standing, si lting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywh e re in pu blic view with
any othe r defendanr BER member named herein" (e mpha sis added)). This would necessa rily
enta il fo regoi ng enjoining gangs as unincorporate d ass ociation s. See supra notes 49, 150-52, 158
and accompa nying tex t.
25 0 Lanzeua, 306 U .S. at 456 (noting vague terms may be sa ved if a court places a limiting
co nstruction on them). To be effective, this lim iti ng construction shou ld be made before a give n
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ifornia Street Te rr ori sm Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act
includ es a definition of gang membership 25 1 that courts have held is
not unconstitutionally vague. 252 Thus, .the provisions limiting defendants' ability to associate with other gang members can probably survive a vagueness challenge if their scope is limited to prohibiting
association with other named defendants or if gang membe rship is defined specifically enough to satisfy th e Due Process Clause.
With rega rd to overbreadth, a regulation is impermissibly overbroad if it deters a substa nti al amount of constitutionally protected
conduct while purportin g to res trict or prohibit nonprot ected activiti es. 253 If so, the Co urt must then evaluate whether the injunctio n is
vulnerable to se lective en forc e ment. 254 Given that associati o n al acti vity a mong gang memb e rs is ne ither sufficiently expressive nor intima te
enough to receive constitutional protectio n,2 55 it is unlikely that an
injunction te rm restricting gang m e mbers' ability to associate with one
anothe r will be found to de ter a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct, particul a rly where alternate channels of communica tio n are ava ilabl e .256 Moreover, as with void-for-v ag ueness, any
co ncerns about possible selective enforcement can be dispelled b y e njoining gang memb e rs by name and by incorporating a more specif1c
definition of gang membership. 257 Thus, even if the terms restricting
gang members ' associational activity do raise some overbreadth ISsues, as in void-for-vagueness, these issues can be easily settled.

B.

Prohibitions Against Annoying or Harassing Residents

The provisions prohibiting defendants from annoying, harassing,
intimidating, or threatening residents and citizens are also suspect on
defe ndant 's case is conside red , as it is unfair to argue that a co nstructi on made su bseq uen t to
arrest gave a defe ndant notice of what co nduct was prohibit ed. !d.
251 CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 186.22(a) , (e). For the text of this definition, see supra note 155. For
a list of similar definitions in o th er jurisdictio ns. see id.
252 See In re Alberto R. (People v. Alberto R.) , 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Ca l. Ct. App. 1991);
People v. Gamez, 286 Ca l. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Gree n. 278 Ca l. Rptr. 140
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991 ); accord State v. Walker, 506 N.W.2d 430, 432-33 (Iowa 1993) (upholding
similar statute against vague ness challen ge) .
253 City of H o uston v. Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1 987); Broadrick v. Oklah oma, 413 U.S. 601,
61 5 (1973). Injunctions can be overbroa d in th e same manner as sta tutes. Madsen v. Women's
Health C tr. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S.
308. 321 n.1 (1980) (White, J .. disse ntin g) (noting that revi ew did not repudiate lower court's
ho ldin g that " [w] e re a Texas co urt to issue an overbroad injunction restricting nono bscene (and
th erefore protected) matt er. it would exce ed both its co ns titution al and its statutory authority" );
H o uchins v. KQED , In c .. 438 U .S. 1, IS (1978) (Stewart, J. , concurring) (noting injunctions mu st
be framed to accommodate First A me ndment) .
254 H ili, 482 U .S. at 465 -66; TI10rnhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-98 (1940).
255 See supra part III.A .J-2.
256 See supra notes 94- 109 and accompanying tex t.
257 See supra not es 2-\S-5 2 and accompanying tex t.
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b o th vag uene ss and ove rbre adth gro unds. 258 In Coates v. City of Cin cinnati ,259 the Co urt confro nt ed a city o rdinance making it a criminal
o ffen se for " three or more pe rso ns to assemble . . . on any of th e
side walks .. . a nd th e re conduct th e ms elves in a m a nn e r a nn o ying to
pe rso ns pas sing by. " 2 60 The Court held that th e te rm " a nno y" was
n either suffi ci entl y definite th a t pe rs ons of comm on intellige nce could
und e rsta nd what co nduct was being prohibited, nor specific enough to
o ffe r sta nda rd s th a t d isco urage arb itra ry enforce m e nt. 261 Therefore , it
held th a t the o rdin a nce was void for vaguen ess .262 Injunctio ns th a t
h ave used te rm s such as " annoy" without a ny furth e r explana ti on
raise vag ueness proble ms similar to th ose raised in Coates .2 6 3 Therefo re, anti ga ng injuncti o ns tha t e mpl oy such terms without further definiti o n264 run th e ri sk of be ing found vo id for vague ness.
H owever, ci ties can tak e steps to avo id vague ness proble m s. For
exampl e, injuncti ons using term s such as " harass" a nd "annoy" have
sur vive d vag uen ess chall e nges wh e n th e injuncti o n include d a specific
inte nt require me nt2 65 or mor e specific d efiniti ons o f " harass" and " anno y."266 If draft e rs o f a nti gan g injunctions include similar la nguage ,
such injuncti on pro visions will more likely survive vagu e ness
challenge.
Coates al so held th at terms such as " harass " and " annoy," whe n
used with out furth e r definiti o n, raise significant o ve rbreadth con2 5 8 See M. Katherin e Boyc huk . Co mme nt , A re Stalking Laws Unconstitwionally Vague or
Overbroad? , 88 Nw. U. L. R Ev. 769, 784 (1 994) (noting that the terms "ha rass" and "a nnoy"
pose vague ness problems) .
2 59 402 U .S. 611 (1971).
260 !d. at 611.
261 !d. at 61 4 & n.4.
2 62 !d. at 614.
2 63 E. g., Foods Inc. v. Leffle r, 240 N.W.2d 91 4, 923 (Iowa 1976) (d issol vin g injunction tha t
pro hibited " annoy in g pe rsons atte mptin g to e nter [a su permark et] " whe re what constituted annoy ing acti vity was not specified). Co mme nta to rs have noted, howeve r, that courts have appli ed
Coates in co nsistently, maki ng any predi ction s based on CM tes so mewh at unce rtain . See, e.g.,
Boychuk, sup ra note 258, at 785, 788.
264 See supra part IT. B.S.
2 65 E. g., Su pe rior Sav. Ass 'n v. Cleve land Cou ncil of U nemployed Wo rke rs, 501 N.E.2d 91,
95 -96 ( O hio Ct. App. 1986).
266 E. g.. State v. Zoe llick. 466 N.W.2 d 911 (Wis. Ct. A pp.) (unpu blished disposi ti on ava il ab le
at 1991 WL 19070) (ho lding inju nc ti on con tai ni ng expli cit de fini tion of " harass me nt" no t unconstituti onall y vague), review denie d , 471 N.W .2d 510 (Wis. 1991) ; cf Pe opl e v. Whitfield , 498
N. E. 2d 262 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding th at " harass" used in statute not vag ue whe n viewed in
li ght of contex t an d purpose of sta tute) : Sta te v. Smith , 737 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. Ct. App.)
(ho ldin g sta tute con tain ing explicit de fi ni ti on of " harassment" not unconstitution ally vagu e)
aff'd , 759 P.2d 372 (Was h. 1988). Bu t see City o f Sea ttl e v. Huff, 75 1 P.2d 879, 881- 82 (Was h Ct.
Ap p. 1988) (h olding ordin ance that d id not co nt ain ex pli cit definition of " harass" or "inti mida te" not vague), aff'd, 767 P.2d 572 (Was h. 1989). In the absen ce of such definiti ons o n th e face
of th e inju nction, co urts may wish to loo k to othe r stat uto ry definiti o ns of harassme nt to so lve
vag ueness prob lems.
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ce rns. 267 The lack of clarifying s tand a rds re nd e rs these prohibitions
quite susceptible to selective e nforce ment. 268 Howeve r, the ove rbreadth concerns can be addressed in much the sa me wa y as the
vague ness concerns were addre ssed26'-J since courts hav e tended to uphold regulations using such te rms when th ey included m ore specific
definitions of what constituted ha rass ing or annoying beha vior e ither
directl y or by referen ce to other sta tutory provisions.27°
Y.

PR OC ED U RAL

D uE

PRo c Ess

In ad dition to potentially violating a ll ege d gang members' su bsta nti ve co nstitution a l ri gh ts, t he us e of antigang injunctions and othe r
civil remedies to control a nti socia l behavio r raises e quall y serious
quest ions about alleged gang m embers' procedural constit uti o n al
r ight s.:m Commentators have exp ressed concern that incre ased us e of
civil rem edie s to control be ha vio r tra d itio nally addressed by the crimina l law will effectively circumve nt the procedural protections normally accorded criminal defendant s by th e Co nstitution. 272
A mong civil re medies, injunction s place particularly severe pressure o n d efe ndants' procedura l rights.273 As the Co urt noted in iHadsen v. Women's H ealth Center, Inc. :
Th ere are obvious differences ... between an injunction and a generally
ap plicable ordinance. Ordinances represent a legislative cho ice regardin g promotion of particular societal inte rests. Injunctions, by contrast,
267 See Coates, 402 U .S a t 614-1 5; Boychuk , supra no te 258, at 785-87.
268 See supra no te 254 a nd accom pan yi ng text. As with vo id-fo r-vague ness challen ges to in junctions using th e te rms '·a nnoy" a nd " harass '" witho ut a ny furth er explan at io n, courts have
bee n inconsistent with their vi ews o f such res trictions. Compare Donley v. C ity o f Mo unt ain
Brook, 429 So. 2d 603, 611-13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (upholding te lep ho ne ha rass men t sta tute
using te rms with out explanation as no t o ve rbro ad), rev 'd on oth er grounds sub nom. Ex parte
Donl ey, 429 So. 2d 618 (Al a. 1983) with City of Everett v. Moo re, 683 P.2d 617, 618-19 (Wash.
Ct . App. 1984) (invalidating general harassment statut e using simil ar language as o ve rbro ad) .
See generally Boychuk , supra no te 258 a t 786-87 & n.l01 (detai ling cases d ea ling with ove rb re adt h challenges to ge ner a l harassment, teleph o ne ha rassmen t, and d isord e rl y cond uct sta tutes using th e te rms "harass" a nd " annoy").
269 See supra no tes 265 -66 and accompanyin g text.
270 See supra no tes 250-52, 257. 266 and acco mpan yi ng text.
271 See C he h, supra no te 20, a t 1371- 89; Jonathan I. C harn e y. The Need fo r Consiitutional
Pr01ections for Defendams in Civil Penalty Cases. 59 CoR C' ELL L. R Ev . 478, 482 (1974); Kenn et h
Mann, Pwzirive Civil Sanctions: Th e Middlegro und Bei\Veen Crimina l and Civil L aw , 101 YALE
L.J. 1795, 1798, 1843 (1992).
272 Charn ey, supra note 271, at 482, 516-1 7; C he h, supra note 20, a t 1394-1404; Mann. supra
note 271 , at 1871; see a/so F ELI X FRA N KFURT E R & NATHAN GREEN E, THE L ABOR I NJUNCTION
107 & n.l 05 (1963) (stating that "( t] o make the infr action of a criminal statue also a con te mpt o f
court is esse ntially an inve ntion to evade the sa feguards o f criminal proced u re and to cha nge the
tribuna l for determining guilt" ).
273 See Che h, supra no te 20, at 1364-69: Earl C. Dud ley, G euing Beyo nd the Civil/Criminal
D isrin crion: A New Approach to lhe Regulation of Indirect Contemp1s. 79 V A. L. REv. 1025,
103-+- 47 (1993) .
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a re re medi es impose d fo r vi o lations (or threa ten ed violation s) o f a legisla ti ve o r judicial decree. Injunctions also carry grea ter ri sks of ce nsorship and di scriminatory application than do ge ne ral ordinances.27 4

In particular, th e wide discretion given judges in fashioning public
nuisance remedi es suggests that greate r procedural pro tection is appropriate. Public nuis a nce sta tutes a re stat ed in e xtre m e ly broad
t e rm s, 27 ~ giving judges the freedom to proscribe otherwise legal acts
and cre at e pe rsonal criminal codes. 276 Wh en the bre adth of these statut es is combined with the extre me defer ence accorded b y re view ing
courts to th e issuance of public nuisance injuncti on s, 2 77 a judge 's
powe r to fa shion such rem edies is immen s e. 27 ~:>
A t first blush, procedural concern s rai sed by antigang injuncti o ns
ap pear to be mitigated by th e fact that injunctions are enfor ced by
criminal cont e mpt proceedings during which the defe nd a nt is e ntitled
to th e full ra nge of procedura l protections no rmall y asso cia te d with
criminal law. 2 79 H o wever, o n close r inspecti o n, it becomes appar e nt
th at th ese protections are provided only wh e n it is too late to affect
the me rits of th e case . This is because injunctions are subj ect to the
"coll a ter al bar rule ," which pre vents defe ndants from challe nging t he
constitutionality of an injunction at a contempt of court he aring, requiring that defendants instead raise these iss ues in a motion to dissolve th e injunction. This rule therefore limits the issues in a
contempt of court hearing to whether the court had jurisdiction to
iss ue the injunction and whether the defendant knowingly violated
it. 2 80 Gi ven this bar to constitutional challe nges at th e contempt stage ,
it is particularly important that those defendants be provided with
both the opportunity and the resources to contest the injunction 's constitutionality before the action reaches that stage .
The provision of two procedural protections would greatly lower
th e risk that a person will be subjected to an erroneous or unconstitu2 74 Madse n v. Women' s Health

Ctr. , Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 25 16,2524 (1994) (cit a tion s omitted ).

2 75 See, e.g. , CAL Ctv. Co DE §§ 3479, 3480. For full tex t of these statutes, see supra note 24.
276

C he h, supra no te 20, at 1406, 1407.

2 77 Whethe r an injuncti on sh all be granted is a ma tt er restin g in th e sound di screti o n o f th e

tri a l co urt. Ca te rpill ar Tractor Co. v. Internati onal Harv ester Co., 106 F .2d 769 (9th Ci r. 1939);
Whol esa le Tobacc o D ea lers Bureau v. Nation al Cand y & Tobacco Co. , 82 P. 2d 3 (Cal. 1938).
278 Cf Cheh, sup ra not e 20, at 1407-08 (di sc ussing th e potenti al fo r judicial abuse in civil
prot ectio n o rders for domes tic viol e nce). Th e sa me pote nti al fo r abuse Professor Che h sees in
ci vil protecti on orders exists with re ga rd to antigan g nui sa nce abatement orders.
2 79 Cheh, supra note 20, at 1368; Dudl ey, supra note 273 , a t 1032 & n.22. No te th a t in creasin g
th e procedural protections afforded enjoin ed ga ng membe rs will lik e ly re duce th e a ttractive ness
of anti ga ng injuncti o ns as an law enfo rcement tool. See sup ra note 157.
2RO See Walk e r v. Cit y o f Birmingham , 388 U.S. 307 (1967); U nited Stat es v. Unit ed Min e
Wo rk e rs, No. 759, 330 U. S. 258 (1947); H owat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 ( 1922). This rule is not
uni versa l. Fo r exa mple, the Cal iforni a Supre me Co urt in th e past has all owed de fe ndant s to
ch allen ge th e constitution ality of injuncti ons without moving to di ss olv e th em notwith standing
th e coll a tera l bar rule. In re Barr y, 436 P.2d 273, 280-82 (Cal. l96R).
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tiona! ant iga ng injunction. First, judges should no t issue court orde rs
ex parte, depriving the subj ect of the injunction of the cha nce to be
he ard on the m atter and shifting the burde n of proof to th e a lleged
gang member to show that th e court order was improperl y ap plied.281
Seco nd, indige nt defendants should be provided with appointed counsel so that they ca n chall enge both the scope of the injuncti on and the
factua l basis for subject ing them to the injunction. 2 8 2
1l1e Supreme Court has developed two separate approaches to
determine which procedural protections should apply in specific cases ,
and this Pa rt will analyze the applicability of each approach to antigang inj un ctions. First, th e Court has developed an expansive, if
somew hat incoherent, jurisprude nce to determine whether th e procedural protections normally associated with the criminal law should appl y to civil re medies closely aligned with the crimin al law. 283 Second,
starting wi th th e landmark case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 284 the Co urt
has held that the Due Process Clauses mandate certain procedures
eve n in civil cases. 2s5 Secti o n A concludes that antigang injunctio ns
probably do not meet the criteria for invoking criminal-type procedural protecti ons. Section B argues that under two post-Mathews
cases, United States v. Jam es Daniel Good R eal Property 2 i> 6 and
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services ,287 alleged gang me mbers
sho uld be provided with a contested hearing and appointed counsel
before injunctions are imposed.
A.

The Civil/Criminal Distinction and Criminal
Procedural Protections

The distinction between the civil and criminal law, while paradigmatic in A nglo-American law, has proven quite elusive. 288 The fundam ental question becomes what is the proper me ans for drawing this
distinction,2 89 and the Court has used both formal and function al tests
281 Cf C heh , supra note 20, at 1399 -1400, 1407 (questioning th e sufficie ncy of ex par1e p rocedure s in civi l forfeiture and recogn izing that civil protecti o n o rde rs may be issue d ex p arte ). Th e
use of ex parte procedures may also put pressure aga inst the Fifth Amendment privil ege against
se lf-in crimination in cases where the basis for the civil remedy may form the ba sis for a criminal
prosecuti on as we ll. !d. at 1384-89.
2 82 See id. a t 1394 -95 .
2 83 See Mann. supra note 271, at 1816-43.
2 84 424 U.S. 319 (1976) .
2 85 !d. at 333-34.
286 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (5-4 decisi on) .
287 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (5-4 decision).
2 8 8 Professo r Mann has id e ntifi e d severa l paradigmatic distinction s betwee n the civi l a nd
crim ina l law, including th e presence of co mpen sa tory vers us punitive purposes behind the reg ulat ion , th e use of subject ive ve rsus objectiv e liabilit y, th e types of re medies available. and th e
types of procedures used. Mann, supra not e 271, at 1805-13 .
289 Cheh, supra not e 20, at 1325 , 1348-49; J. Morris Clark, Civil and Crim inal Penalties and
Forfeirures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. R Ev. 379, 397 (1976); Ta ma ra
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to dete rmine whether a sanction is criminal or civi!2 90 and thus
wh e ther a defendant should or should not receive the full range of
constitutional criminal procedural protections. 291
At times , the Court has adopted a formal test, deferring to Congress's designation of a remedy as ci vil and treating the civil/criminal
question as one of statutory construction. 292 Under one version of this
test, the legislature's d esignation of a sanction as civil or criminal beca me the key factor in de termining whether criminal procedural protections should apply. 293 In another version , the Court focused on the
presence or absence of certain procedures and remedies to determine
wh e ther a sanction was civil or crimina\.2 94 Given nuisance doctrine's
historical and statutory basis in civil law 295 and the fact that nuisance
actions do no t invo lve the procedures or the remedies traditionally
asso ciated with th e criminal law,2 96 it is unlikely that a formal test
would indicate that defendants of antigang injunctions should be afforded the procedural protections granted criminal defendants.
Comme ntators have criticized formal tests on a number of
grounds. 297 The principal criticism was that in focusing on instrumental indicia and ignoring the consequences of the sanction, the formal
test often found sanctions to be civil even though they lacked the kind
R. Pi e ty, Comment, Scorched Earth: How th e Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrin e H as Laid

Wasre to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. R Ev. 911, 943 (1991).
290 Note that these approaches sho uld not be consid ered mutually e xclusive . Supreme Court
decisions have often combin ed form al a nd functional approaches. E.g., United States v. Ward,
448 U. S. 242, 248-49 (1 980) ; Kenn edy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 -69 (1 963) ;
H e lvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 , 395, 398- 405 (1938).
291 The se ri ghts includ e the right to a public trial , the ri ght to confront one 's accusers, the
ri ght of compulsory process, the right to a speedy trial, th e right to be informed of the nature of
th e accusation , the ri ght to a jury trial (when th e possibl e incarceration exceeds six months) , and
th e right to counse l. See Charney, supra note 271, at 478-89.
292 E.g. , lvlitchell, 303 U .S. at 399.
293 See Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871). See gen erally Mann , supra
no te 271, at 1820-23 (tracing the development of the formal approach); Lawrence A . Kaste n ,
Note, Ex tending Constiwrional Prorection to Civil Forfeiwres that Exceed Rough Rem edial Com p ensalion, 60 G EO . WA SH. L. REv. 194, 205-06, 210 (1991) (same).
294 E.g. , !'>'lendo za-Martin ez, 372 U.S. at 168-69; H elwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 , 610-12
(1903). See generally Charn ey, supra note 271 , at 491-505 (providin g a complete catalog of instrumental crite ria used by the Court).
295 See, e. g., supra note 24.
296 For exa mpl e, although nuis ance actions bear some o f th e indicia of a criminal action, see
Charney, supra note 27.1. , at 505 (stat e as the pl aintiff), the vast majority of instrumental indicia
indicat e that nuisance acti ons are not criminal, because th ey a re not initiated by indictment, do
not require sci e nt er, lack a se nse of mo ral conde mnation, and do not involv e incarceration, see
id. at 491-505.
297 Comm e ntato rs have , imer alia , criticized the form al approach because it is circula r- a
sanction is ci vil because it is civil , Mann, supra note 271, at 1823; Pi ety, supra note 289, at 920,
and because defe rence to fo rm al designations wo uld o bviate the Co urt 's hi storical role in reviewin g le gislation to dete rmine whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional auth orit y,
Charn ey, sup ra note 27 1, at 494.
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of proportionality to be expected under the compensation-oriented
civil paradigm. 298 Consequently, the Court has been forc ed to characterize particularly harsh sanctions as government reimburseme nts 299
or liquidated damages 300 to explain the apparent disproportionality
and to justify calling them civiJ.30 1
This has led many commentators to prefer a functional test similar to the one advanced in Boyd v. United Srates, 302 in which the Court
used a functional test to compare the purpose of a civil forfeiture sta tute and the nature of its remedy, determined the sanction to be
"quasi-criminal," and extended to civil defendants of such actions
some of the protections norm ally affo rded only to criminal defe ndants.303 In making such a comparison, a functional test can represe nt
the proportionality demanded by the compensation-oriented civil law
paradigm . Therefore, under the functional test, particularly egregious
terms in an antigang injunction might be sufficiently disproportionate
to render a n antigang injunction "quasi-criminal" and allow injunction
defendants to receive some of the benefits of criminal procedural protections.304 However, subsequent decisions of the Court have severely

298 See C lark, supra note 289, at 469-75; Mann, supra note 271, at 1823-30; Pi e ty , supra note
289, at 958.
299 E.g., H elvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1938) (characterizing in part 50% addition to tax deficiency as a rei mburseme nt for investigation cost).
300 E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 n.26 (1974) (calling
forfeiture in part security for violations of the law); cf United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943) (analogizing double damages to liquidated damages) (superse ded by
statute).
301 Professo r Mann termed the Cou rt 's characterization of certain sancti o ns as remedial to fit
them into th e paradigm a " lega l fiction." Mann , supra no te 271, a t 1830; see also Clark. supra
note 289, at 391-92 & nn .38-40.
302 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See generally Mann. supra note 271. at 1818-19 (describing the functional approach).
303 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634; see also Cha rn ey, supra no te 271 , at 516 (advoc ating the functional
approach); Mann , supra not e 271, a t 1818-19 (advocating the functional approach). But see
Cheh, supra note 20, a t 1360 (advocating a formal approach but arguing for expanded proce dural pro tectio ns in civil actions ge ne rally).
304 Injunctions are arguably poorly suited to functional analysis. Such an alysis necess arily
requires a comparison of the value of the sancti on assessed aga in st the defendant with the approximate costs to the government. See Hal pe r v. United States, 490 U.S. 435, 446-48 ( 1989);
Mann, supra note 271, at 1840. H owever, it is particularly difficult to determine the value remedies such as injunctions present to defendants , making it difficult for an e nj o in ed party to
demonstrate the kind of imbalance necessa ry to tri gger th e extension of procedural protecti o ns
under functional analysis.
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limited Boyd305 and have used the functional approach very
infrequently. 3 0 6
Both the critics and the supporters of the Court's tendency toward form alism saw the Court's 1989 decision of United States v.
Halper 307 as a possible return to functional tests. 308 In Halper, the
respondent was convicted of making $585 in false claims to the federal
government and sentenced to two years in prison and a $5,000 fine. 3 0 9
The government subsequently instituted a civil action against him in
which he was fined more than $130 ,000. 310 Respondent moved to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy. 3 11 Focusing on the str an d of
double jeopardy that prohibits multiple punishments for the same offe nse, the Court held that the governmen t was entitled to rough remedia l justice in a civil action. 31 2 However, the Court held that when the
supposedly remedial sanction does not approximate the government's
actual damages and costs, rough justice becomes injustice, and the
purportedly remedial sanction becomes punishment and is barred by
double jeopardy. 3 13 The Court distinguished Ward by reaso ning that
while the civil/criminal distinction may be important for double jeopardy's other aspects, the civil/criminal distinction was unimportant
with regard to the multiple punishments aspect.3 14
Given the Court's previous deference to Congress's designation
of a sanction as civil and its tendency toward formalism and toward
finding remedial purposes in similar cases, 31 5 commentators viewed
the Court's return to a functional analysis in determining whether a
305 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (declining to extend Boyd's Fifth
Amendment protections in civil forfeiture cases to civil fines cases); see also Kas ten , supra note
293, at 203-05 (noting that the Court has declined to apply other criminal procedural protections,
such as the re asonable-doubt burden of proof, Fifth and Sixth Amendment procedural protections, the prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Cl a use , to civil
forfeiture cases).
306 E ven when the Court used a functional test, it did so in an extremely limited way. For
example, in Ward , although the Court combined functional and formal tests in determining
whether civil fines should be protected by the Fifth Am endment , it impose d a pres umption in
favor of Congress's designation of a statute as civil o r criminal, req uiring " the clearest proof"
before the presumption would be displaced. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. Thus, eve n though the
Co urt nominally applied a functional test, in imposing a presumption in fav or of the formal test,
th e Court effectively ev iscerated the test. See Kasten, supra note 293, at 210-11.
307 490 U .S. 435 (1989).
308 See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1375-76; Mann, supra note 271, at 1842-43.
309 Ha lper, 490 U.S. at 437.
310 !d. at 438.
311 !d.
312 !d. at 446.
313 !d.
314 !d. at 448.
315 See, e.g., H e lvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,402 (1938) (applying formal approach implicitly); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 552 (1871) (applying formal approach
ex plicitl y); see also supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
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cons ti tut io nal procedural protection applied in a civil case as a potenti al jurisp ruden tia l break through. 316 Although the Court had neve r
formally repu d iated the functional a pproach it followed in Boyd, its
disuse raised serio us questions as to its vitality. 317 In Halper , commentators saw ren ewed potential for functi o nal a na lys is to justify a
much broa der exte nsion of criminal procedural protections to ci vi l
cases, 31R a lth ough such a consequence was fa r from mandated. J 19
T he ex te n t to which Halp er marked a change in the Court's ap proach to punitive civil sa nctions was partially a nswered in Austin v.
Un ited Stares. 320 In A ustin , the Court add ressed whether the E ight h
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil forfeiture whe re
the governmen t was the movin g party. 321 Following Halper' s focus on
the punit ive/nonp unitive distinction rather than th e civil/crimi na l distinction , the Court began by observing th at th e E ighth Ame ndm ent
was intended to preven t the government fro m abusin g its powe r to
punis h an d that unlike the Sixth Amendment and the se lf-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, nothing in th e text or the history
of the E ighth A mendme nt limited it to criminal cases_ :m The Court
co ncluded that since forfeitures have historically been viewed as punish me nt and th e re was nothing in the text or the legislative history o f
t he forfei ture sta tute in question to indicate th at anything bu t punishment was intended , th e forfeiture in ques tion was properly conside red
p unishm e nt and was subject to the Excessive Fines Cla use of the
E ighth A mendme nt. J23
A ny inference that Halp er marked a return to the functional approach to th e civil/criminal distinction is undercut by Austin. A ustin
re lied exclusively on formal statutory analysis,324 in sta rk contrast to
the functional reasoning of Halper. 325 When read toget he r, it beco mes rather unlikely that Halper represents a wid espread re turn to
functional tests. Instead , the common thre ad in Austin a nd Halp er is
the Co urt 's focus on the punitive/nonpunitive distinction in d etermining whether grea ter proced ural protection should be extended, not the
type of analysis used .
316 Cheh, supra note 20. at 1375 -76; Ma nn , supra note 271 , at 1842-43: Ka sten, supra note 293 ,
at 226-43.
317 See Mann. sup ra note 271 , at 1842.
31 :> Che h, supra note 20, at 1375-76; Mann , supra note 271 , at 1842-43; Ka sten, supra not e 293,
at 226 -43.
319 Cheh, supra note 20, at 1377-79.
:no 1135.0.280 1 (1993).
321 !d. at 2803.
322 !d. at 2805.
3 23 No te thai !lusrin in no way repudiated the fun ct ion al analysis of Haip er a nd sho uld not be
int e rpreted as preciuding a subsequem court from adopti ng a functi onal pe rspective.
324 A1win, 113 S. Ct. at 2805.
32 5 Halper. 490 U .S. at 448.
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In sum, although Halper and Austin mark a breakthrough in extending certain procedural protections to civil cases, they probably do
not indicate a widespread return to functional analysis. Accordingly,
the Court will likely continue to rely on formal analysis in draw ing the
civil/criminal distinction and will likely not extend the right to a contest ed hearing and the right to appointed counsel to all antigang injunctio n cases because they are quasi-criminal.
B.

The ]\!Iathews Balancing Test and Civil Procedu ral Due
Process Protecrions

T he D ue Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that
" [n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process o f law." 326 Under the requirements of due process , the
Supreme Co urt has established that civil defendants are generally entitl ed to notice, an o pportunity to be heard, and such other procedures
as will ensure an accurate and rational resolution. 327 The three-part
balancing test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge328 determines what procedures du e process requires in civil actions. Mathews requires courts
to conside r: (1) the private interest affected by the official action, (2)
the risk of a n erroneous deprivation of that interest through th e procedures used, and (3) the government's interests, including the administrative burden that the additional procedural requirements would
pose.329
This section argues that the Court's decisions applying the M athews test in other civil proceedings indicates that these same protections should be extended to defendants of antigang injunctions.
Subsection 1 argues that courts should not impose antigang injunctions ex parte, and subsection 2 argues that enjoined gang members
should be given the right to appointed counsel to enable indigents to
defend themselves.
1. Ex parte Proceedings as D etermined in James
Real Property v. United States.-The right to prior
predeprivation hearing is central to the Constitution's
due process. 3 30 Such a hearing helps ensure fairness for

Daniel Good
notice and a
commands of
the individual

32fi U .S. CoNsT. amend. V. 'n1e Court has interpre ted libe rty and pro pe rt y broadl y, subjec tmg acti o ns to termin a te we lfare be nefits, garnish wa ge s, revoke a driver 's license. a nd d is miss a
fe deral e mpl oyee to due process sc rutiny. Mathews v. E ldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 ( 1976).
327 Mathews , 424 U.S. at 333 -34.
328 424 U. S. 319 (!976).
329 !d. at 335.
330 U nit ed States v. James Danie l G ood R eal Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993) (5 -4 deci sion); U nit ed States v. $8 ,850,46 1 U. S. 555,562 n.12 (1983); F uentes v. Shevin , 407 U .S. 67,8082 (1 972 ); Mullane v. Cent rai Hanove r Bank & Trust Co .. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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and se rves to protect citizens from arbitrary government
e ncroa chment. 331
The Court has allowed exceptions to the general rul e requirin g
predeprivation notice and hea rin g o nly in " extraordinary situations
where some valid governm e nt al interes t is a t stake th a t justifies postponing the hearing until after t he eve nt. " 332 In United States v. Jam es
Daniel Good Real Property, 33 -' the fed e ral gove rnment seized the respo nde nt's home and th e land on whi ch it stood in an ex parte proceeding.334 The Court considered whether due process prohibited th e
govern me nt in a civil forfe iture case from se izing real property witho ut first affording the owner no ti ce and an opportunity to be he ard. 335
The Court appli ed th e Mmhews tes t in evalu ating th e sufficiency
of the ex parte proceeding. 336 It co ncluded that the first Mathews factor-the priva te inte rest affe cted by the o ffi cial ac tion - favo red th e
respondent. 337 In so holding, the Co urt ana logized Good to its d ecision in Fuentes v. Shevin 3 38 where it held that the loss of kitchen appliances and household furniture was signi fican t e no ugh to warrant a
deprivation hearing. 339 The Good Co urt co ncluded th at th e respond e nt 's interests in his hom e far exceeded tho se in Fuen tes in mere
chattels and that his inte res ts in m aintaining control of his hom e and
being free from governme nt al interfere nce "weigh[ ed) heavily in the
Mathews balance."3 4o
The Good Court also concluded that the second Mathews factor
favored the respondent because th e ex parte seizure created an unacceptable risk of error. 341 The Court reasoned that " [t)he purpose of
an adversary hearing is to ensure the req uisite neutrality that must
inform all governmental d ecisionmaking." 342 A postse izure he aring,
the Court noted, may be no recompense for losses caused by an erroneous determination given the backlog of civil cases and the fact that
the subsequent hearing, even if decided in favor of th e responde nt ,
331
332

Good. 114 S. Ct. at 500-01.
!d. at 501 (quot ati ons omitted); see also Fuemes, 407 U.S. at 82; Boddi e v. Conn ecticut ,
401 U .S. 371, 379 (1971).
333 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (5-4 decisio n).
334 !d. at 497.
335 !d.
336 !d. at 501.
337 !d.
338 407 U.S. 67 ( 1972).
339 !d. at 70-71 (ci ted in Good , 114 S. Ct. at 501) .
340 Good, 114 S. C t. at 50 1.

34 1 /d .
342 !d.

at 502. The Court also noted that "' fairne ss ca n rarely be o btai ned by sec ret, onesided determination o f fact s decisive o f rights . . . No be tt er in strum ent ha s been devised for
a rri ving at truth th an to gi ve a pe rso n in jeopardy of se rious loss notice o f the case agai nst him
and o pportun it y to mee t it.'" /d. at 504 (q uoting Joi nt Anti -Fascist R efugee Comm. v. McGrath .
341 U.S . 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurte r, J. co ncurring)).
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" 'would not cure the temporary depri va tion th at an earlier he aring
might have preve nted.' "3 4 3
Furthermore, the Court found that th e third Mathews factor fa vored th e respondent. The Court framed the govern m ent a l inte res t as
the pressing need for prompt action in the particular case. 3 44 The
Court concluded th at in this case , unlik e in forfeiture cases in volving
chattels, there was no pressing ne ed to justify ex p arte seizure because
the property seized was real property that could not abscon d a nd the
governm e nt's interests could be adequately pro tected by filing a lis
pendens against it. 345 In so holding, th e Co urt distinguished Calera Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co . ,w; in which it uph e ld the ex parte
seizure of a yacht. 347 Unlike Calero -Toledo , in which the m ovable nature of the property required tha t th e court se ize the property to establish jurisdicti o n over it a nd preve nt it fr om disap pe aring, Good
involved real property, the immobility of which guaranteed jurisdiction and prevented disappearance .348
The Court's decision in Good supports the co nclusio n that the ex
parte issuance of antigang injunctio ns violates th e requirem e nts o f due
process under Mathews. First, the gang members' private interes ts in
personal liberty should be significant enough to tip the first fac tor in
the ir fa vo r. Although in weighing the first Mathews factor courts have
bee n disinclined to give significant weight to nonprop e rty interests,3 4 9
courts could just as well follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Goo d and conclude that gang members ' liberty interests in associating
with others, moving freely about their neighborhoods, and controlling
their own appearance are more constitutionally significant than, for
instance, a party's interest in kitchen appliances and household furniture.350 Moreover, the recognition in G ood that all individuals have a
strong interest in remaining fre e from governmental inte rests also
" weighs heavily in the Math ews balance" against ex parte issuance of
antigang injunctions.3s1
Second, the risk of error in issuing an injunctio n against gang
members is quite significant. As noted earlier, governmental bodies
depend on adversarial hearings to ensure fairn ess and pre vent arbitrary decision making. 352 Moreover, as noted earlier, law e nfo rc ement's fr equent use of legally insufficient evidence m ga ng cases
34 3
34 -1

l d. at 502 (quo ti ng Conn ecticu t v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 15 (1 99 1)).
Jd.
.

at 502-04.
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
Id. at 679.
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502-03 .
See Cheh , sup ra note 20, at 1395.
See Fuent es v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70-7 1 (1972).
See sup ra not e 340 an d accompanying text.
See supra notes 330-31, 342 and accompanying text.

345 Jd.
34 6
347
348
349

350
351
352
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indicates that InJUnctions against alleged gang members run particularly high risks of error. 353 The ability of court orders to act as " priva te penal codes" makes the consequences of erroneous
determination particularly onerous. 354 And lastl y, as in Good, the opportunity for a subsequent contested hearing m ay no t be timely a nd in
any even t wo uld likely be insufficient to cure th e deprivation of liberty
suffered by the gang members.35 5
Most im portantly, th e third Mathews factor clearly favors th e alleged gang members. As noted in Good, the hallmar k of an impo rtant
governm ental interest is a pressing need for ex parre proceed ings ,35 6
such as the possibility of prope rty dis ap pea rin g357 or imminen t clanger.358 No such pressing need is prese nt in the ant igang injuncti o n
cases. In fact, allowing governments to enjoin gangs ex pa rte might
destroy an oppo rtunity to deter gang activity, since on e fun ction of
court ord ers is to give suspected gang members notice th at the ir conduct is in question and that serious cons equ ences will ensue if th ey
pe rsist in the ir present behavior. 359 Were governments required to
give defendants notice and a hearing before injunctions were issued,
they might find th a t the notice of hearing alo ne is enough to induce
th em to leave, solving the area's gang proble m. 3 60 Thus, applying th e
logic of Good, it is unlikely that courts will be able to j ustify using ex
parte proceedings to enjoin criminal street ga ngs.

353 See supra part III. A.3.
35 4 See supra notes 20, 273-78 a nd accompanying text. As noted ea rli er , th e colla te ra l bar rule
makes the consequences of the e rroneo us imposition o f a n injunction part icula rly ha rs h. See
supra no tes 279-80 and accompanying text.
355 Good, 114 S. C t. at 502.
356 !d.
357 See Calera-Toledo v. Pe arson Yacht Leasi ng Co., 416

U.S. 663, 679 (1974).

358 Cf Che h, supra note 20, at 1405 & n.427 (noting use of ex parte re lief in awa rding co urt

o rd ers in e me rgency cases of domestic violence).
359 !d. at 1405.
360 See Nick Anderson, S.J. Vows to Rid Area of Gangs: Inju ncrion Targers One Neighb orhood, S AN J o sE MERCURY NEws , Mar. 10, 1993, at 1A (re porting th a t gang membe rs subj ect to
injun ct io n a re likely to le a ve area before enforcement is ne cessa ry). Thi s di s ting uishes a nti ga ng
injunctio ns from the special circumstances found in Calero-Toledo that justifie d proceedi ng ex
parte. In Calero- Toledo, the government's interest in ex parte p roceed in gs wa s st re ngth e ned
because the cha ttels in qu es tio n mi ght disa ppear, which wo uld have eliminated t he basi s for
federa l ju risd ictio n a nd wou ld have a llowed the defendants to hide th em. Calero -Toledo , 416
U.S. a t 679. In antigang injunctions, there is no quest ion o f jurisdiction , see Good, 114 S. C t. at
502-04, a nd the possibility that the gang me mbers might disa ppear we ighs in the o ther d irect ion
beca use the ir disappea rance would fa cilitate rather than complica te the governmen t's act ions.
Any argum e nt th a t the gove rnment interest remain s strong be ca use the dis a pp eara nce of the
gang me mbe rs merely transfers the problem to another ne ighborhoo d, while having some pers uas ivene ss with rega rd to crim inal sanctions, wo uld be in a ppro p riate in a civil nuisance act io n,
which is aim ed at protectin g cit ize ns' enjoy me nt of their p rope rt y.
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2. The Righ t to Appointed Counsel in Civil Actions as D etermined in Lassi ter v. Departm ent of Social Services.-The alleged gang
members' right to co unse l prio r to th e contempt of court stage is critical. 'Without it, they cannot realistically contes t the propriety of the
injunct ions before facing contempt of court charges, and th e co llatera l
bar rul e reduces any hea ring they receive after being ch a rged with
contempt to a mere form ality instead of the constitutional protecti on
it is intended to be.361
The key case in determining whe ther gang me mb ers should have
a right to counsel in a civil ac tion is Lassiter v. D epartment of Social
Services. 362 In Lassiter, the Court evaluate d the petitione r's right to
a ppoi nt ed co unsel in a hearing to terminate her parenta l ri ghts.36 3
Th e Cou rt bega n by abstracting from its precedents th e pres umptio n
agai nst the appo intment of counsel in cases where th e liti ga nt is not
faced with the deprivation of physical liberty. 364 The Court acknowledged th at o th er co urts had traditionally de alt with the right to ap poi nted counsel on a class-by-class basis, ge nerally req umng
appointed counsel in all hearings for termination of parenta l ri ghts. 365
The Court then rej ec ted the class-by-class approach for de termining
whether counsel should be appointed in a given proceeding in favor of
a case-by-case determin ation by the trial judge. 366
The Co urt th en applied the Mathews factors to determine
whether counsel sho uld be appointed in the petitioner's case. 367 The
Court fo und th e petitione r's interest in her parental relati o nship with
361 Cf Jay A. Rose nbe rg, Note, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 CoL UM .
L. R Ev. 390, 403- 06 (1988) (arguing for ap pointed counsel in civil forfeiture actions). In fact, the
ACLU reques ted the appointment of counsel in at least two antigang injuncti o n cases. Peop le v.
" B" St. Boys, No. 735405-4, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alam eda County June 17, 1994) (order
den ying prelimina ry injun ction) (noting that order moo led pe ndin g mo ti on for ap po intm en t of
co un se l); Peo pl e ex rei. Jon es v. Amaya, No. 713223, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County
Nov. 10, 1993) (o rd e r denying preliminary injunction) (sa me); see also Amicus Curiae Brie f in
Opp os iti on to Plai ntiff 's Motio n fo r Pre limin ary Injuncti on at 17-19, "B " St. Boys (N o. 735405 4) (filed June 14, 1994); Supplemental Memorandum in Support of R eques t fo r Ap point ed
Counsel , Amaya (No. 713223) (filed Aug. 30, 1993).
362 452 U. S. 18 (198 1) (5-4 dec ision).
363 !d.
364

at 20-24.
!d. at 26-27.

365 !d. at 30-32. Th e Court al so acknowl edged th at in no othe r case had a court he ld th at an
ind igen t pare nt in term inatio n hea rin gs was not e ntitled to appointed co un se l. !d. a t 30.
3 66 !d. a t 31-32. This shift awa y from class-by-class determin ations has bee n criticized by comme ntators. E.g., Jane E. Jackso n, Lass ite r v. Departm ent of Social Services: Th e Du e Process
Righ t 10 Appointed Counsel Left Hanging Un easily in th e Math ews v. E ldrid ge Balance, 8 N. KY.
L. R Ev. 513 , 527-32 (1981) (discuss in g merits of previo us practice o f cl ass-by-class ba lancing);
Kevin W. Shaugh nessy, Not e, La ss iter v. Dep artm ent of Social Se rvices: A New !nrerest Balancing Test ja r indigent Civil Litigams, 32 CATH. U . L. REv. 261,282-83 (1982) (cri tic izing case -by case ap proac h).
367 Lassiter , 452 U.S. at 31.
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her child to be "extremely impo rtant. " 368 It also identified two governmental interests : the intere st shared with th e petitioner in an accurate and just decision th at protects th e welfare of the child and a
weaker inte rest in administrative econo my .369 On th e risk of erroneo us dep riv ation of rights, the Court acknowledged that " the ultimate
iss ues with which a te rmination hearing dea ls are not a lways simple,
however co mmonplace th ey may be."37°
D espite its recognition of the strength of the petitioner's private
interest, th e eq ui vocal nature of th e gove rnm ent 's interest , and th e
risks of erro neo us deprivation ca used by the co mpl ex ities of terminatio n hearings, the Court non e th eless co ncluded th at clue process did
not require the appointment o f co unsel. 37 1 In so concluding, the
Co urt focu sed on the risk-of-error factor. finding it in favor of th e
gove rnm e nt. 372 The Court reasoned th at despite the admission o f
hearsay evidence and the inco mpl eteness o f the petitioner's defens e ,
t he presence of counsel would ha ve changed nothing and concluded
tha t the a bse nce of grounds for crimina! charges, expe rt witnesses, and
of " troubl esome points of law, procedura l or substantive," justified
the tria l court's re fus al to appoint counsel.3 73
Since Lassiter, many courts hav e been reluctant to re quire on
constitutional grounds the appointment of counsel in civil cases. 374
Neverth eless, if Lassiter's case-by-case a pproach is to be ta ken serio usly, determining whether appointment of counsel is required with
regard to antigang injunctions de pends on an analysis of each individual case's facts.
The application of the Mathews factors for appointment of counsel is similar to their application for ex parte proceedings.3 7 5 First, as
in the case of ex parte proceedings, gang me mbers can asse rt a colora368 !d. a t 27, 31.
369 !d. a t 27 -28, 31.
3 70 !d. a t 30.
37 1 !d. at 33 .
372 !d. a t 32-33.
373 !d.
374 See, e. g., Cloutterbuck v. Cloutterbuck, 556 A .2d 1082, 1085 -87 (D .C. 1989) (applying
Lassi1er and ho lding no right to appointed counse l in civil protection order case despite th e fa ct
that violation of o rde r would be enforced by contempt of cou rt ); Res e k v. State , 706 P.2d 288
(A laska 1985) (holding no ri ght to appointed counsel in civil forfeitur e); see also Shaughnessy,
supra not e 366, at 285 (predicting that Lassiter wo uld ''eviscerate[) the indigent's ri ght to appointment of counsel" in all civil cases by "es ta blish[ing) a vi rtuall y un a ttainabl e pre requi site for
appo int me nt of co unse l"). Professo r Cheh also st a tes that courts are unlikel y to order appo intment o f co un sel in money penalty or RI CO forfeitur e cases. Cheh , supra note 20, a t 1396 n.374 .
In certa in civil actions, state legisla tors may o pt fo r appointment of counsel. See L assiter, 452
U.S. at 34 (noting 33 states and the District o f Col umbi a st atutorily pro vide for appointment of
cou nse l in te rminatio n cases): cf, e.g., WY o . STAT. ANN. § 35 -21-103(e) (Michie Supp. 1993)
(p rov id in g fo r appoin tment of counsel in civil prot eclio n orde rs aga in st domestic viol ence).
375 See supra notes 349-60 a nd acco mpanyin g text.
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ble private interes t in their liberty, 376 although this interes t is arguably
weaker than the private interest in parental rights asse rt e d in Lassiter.
Furthermore, th e governm ental interests in antigang injunctions
may be marginally weake r than the governmental inte rests in Lassiter,
we ighing in fav o r of the appointment of counsel. Although th e state's
interes t in administrative eco no my is the sam e as in Lassiter, its interes t in an accurate decision is argu ably weaker. U nlike in Lassiter,
where the state bore a special burden to protect the welfare of the
child, 377 in the antigang injunctio ns the state is protecting th e public
morals and property rights of th e community, who lack th e vulnerab ility th at me rits increased gove rnm e nt al concern for children.
However, the key difference is the second Mathews fact or- the
risk of e rron eous deprivatio n faced by alleged ga ng members. U nlike
th e p arental termination actions in Lassiter, antigang injunctions presen t difficult problems of proof, the suffici e ncy of which a gang m e mbe r is unlikely to be able to cha llenge without counsel.3 78 M oreover,
unlik e in Lassiter, th e predicate activities alleged ofte n co nstitute
grounds for criminal charges. 379 The risk of erroneous de privation of
liberty is furth e r heightened in injunction cases by the collateral bar
rule. 380 And finally, the iss ues raised in this Comment and the differe nt treatment of identica l court orders in different cases 381 demonstrate that, unlike in Lassiter, antigang injunctions do present
" troublesome points of law, procedural or substantive."382
Therefore, courts will not likely extend criminal-type procedural
protections in antigang injunction cases. However, the manner in
which the Court applied Math ews in Good will likely require that alleged gang members receive a contested hearing before being subjected to such injunctions. Similarly, the Court's application of
Mathews in Lassiter arguably requires that indigent gang members
have counsel appointed for them before being subjected to such
injunctions.

VI.

CoNCLUSION

In the final analysis, the antigang mJunctions survive constituti o nal scrutiny with only minor alterations and will likely represent an
important weapon in state and local governments' antigang a rsenal.
Although the substantive constitutio nal claims are the most salient
and have been the most heavily litigated , on closer inspection, these
376

See supra not es 337-40, 349-51 and accompanyin g text.

377 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.

378 See supra
379 !d. at 32.
380 See supra
3S i

382
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notes 279 -80, 353 and accompan ying text.
See supra notes 46. 49, 51-53 and accompanying text.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 .
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cl a ims fall aw ay fo r th e simpl e re aso n that th e gang memb e rs' ac tion s
tha t give ri se to the nuis ance in the fir st place are no t sufficie ntl y int im a te or ex pressi ve to implicate the gang m emb ers ' co nstitutio nal
rights to assoc iati on and ex pressio n. Moreover, the actio ns that fo rm
th e bas is of the nuisance claim are linked to illegal activity an d can
properly be res tri cte d whe never significant gove rnm ental inte rest s ex ist, notwithstandin g so me infringement of gang m emb ers' right to
trav e l o r ot her subs tant ive co nstitutional rights.
What does e me rge fro m th e a nalysis is th e re al dan ge r of gu il t by
associ ati o n and vag ueness . To avo id these proble ms, law e nforcement
must adh ere to co nstitutionall y permissible stand ards in determin ing
who sho uld be su bj ected to a n anti gang injunctio n, and judges mus t
ca refu lly screen th e evid e nce fo r e ach defendant to ma ke sure each
case mee ts tho se standards. City attorn eys should enj o in gang membe rs by name and should refrain fr o m pursuing gangs as un incorpora ted associati o ns. D raft e rs o f injunctions should also include specific
defi ni tions of what constitutes gang membershi p and what co nduc t is
e nj o ined . Fo rtun ate ly, sta tut es exist that can provid e guid ance fo r the
d rafti ng of such de finiti ons o r that can be incorporated d irectl y by
re fe re nce.
Lastly, judges evaluating antigang injunction s sho uld be kee nl y
aware that the use of such injunctions may de prive de fe nd a nts of impo rtant procedural pro tections , such as the right to a contested hea ring and th e right to appointe d counsel. Although th e de fe ndants to
antigang injunctio ns are pro bably not entitled to the full ra nge o f procedur al pro tections provided to criminal defendants, judge s can still
use th e case-by-case approach of the Mathews balancing test to pro vide th e defe ndant with thos e procedural pro tections, such as a contested hearing and app ointed counsel , needed to ensure that each
alleged gang membe r ge ts a fair he aring and that justice is se rved.
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